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Abstract: This dissertation adds to the body of literature that examines the use of housing equity
by retirees. The Life-Cycle Hypothesis suggests that households save during their working years
and then draw down those savings in retirement. Housing equity constitutes a large portion of
most retiree’s savings portfolios, yet older households are not using their accumulated housing
equity to help increase consumption in retirement and often die with large sums of housing
equity. This dissertation explores housing equity use by older Americas in three ways. Chapter
1 looks at homeownership and moving rates of older Americans and how having a guaranteed
source of income from a defined benefit plan may have mitigated some of the effects of the
Great Recession. Specifically, I find that households with defined contribution plans were 2-2.8
percent less likely to be homeowners after the Great Recession compared to those with a defined
benefit plan. This provides evidence that the guaranteed income from a defined benefit plan may
be a reason why households historically have not used the equity of their house in retirement.
Thus, future households who do not have a defined benefit plan may be more willing to use their
equity in order to maintain levels of consumption as they age. Chapter 2 investigates how a
potential increase in out-of-pocket medical spending for older households may cause them to
engage in precautionary using their home. This chapter suggests that if there were more
adequate health insurance for seniors, then as many as 13 percent of households would be willing
to forgo owning a home in their 70s, which would allow them to use their equity to help finance
consumption in retirement. Chapter 3 concludes this dissertation by exploring how forgoing
time and money spent on home maintenance allows older households to extract housing equity. I
show that households disinvest as much as $43,000 between the ages of 65-84, which could lead
to an additional $2,150 per year to be spent elsewhere. I also look at how this level of
disinvestment compares to other forms of housing equity extraction such as reverse mortgages
and moving.

Housing Dynamics of Older Americans in the 21st Century
Tim Murray

B.A., Economics, Old Dominion University, 2010
M.A., Economics, Old Dominion University, 2013
M.B.A., Business Administration, Old Dominion University, 2013

A Dissertation
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
at the
University of Connecticut

2019

Copyright by
Tim Murray

2019
ii

APPROVAL PAGE
Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation

Housing Dynamics of Older Americans in the 21st Century

Presented by
Tim Murray, B.A., M.A., M.B.A.

Major Advisor _________________________________________________________________
Richard Dunn

Associate Advisor ______________________________________________________________
Charles Towe

Associate Advisor ______________________________________________________________
Kenneth Couch

University of Connecticut
2019
iii

ADKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to thank my major advisor, Dr. Richard Dunn, who provided countless hours of
feedback and guidance that help shaped the way I think as an economist that allowed this
dissertation to be possible. I am grateful for his time and commitment to my success as a graduate
student.
I would also like to thank my associate advisors, Dr. Charles Towe and Dr. Kenneth Couch, who
have been instrumental in my success at the University of Connecticut through their instruction in
the classroom and countless meetings providing feedback and support.
I also acknowledge Dr. Vinod Agarwal, whose mentorship during my time at Old Dominion
University were instrumental in my development as a student and lifelong academic.
Additionally, thank you to Fei Zou, Samantha Trajkovski, and Gabe Giersch who were gracious
with their time to provide feedback on my work.
Finally, thank you to my friends and family for the all the years of support throughout graduate
school, your belief in me helped me more than you will ever know.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 1
Chapter 1
Defined Benefit Pensions and Homeownership in the Post-Great Recession Era................................. 5
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 6
2. Background on the Housing Equity Puzzle ........................................................................................ 9
3. Data and Weighting .......................................................................................................................... 12
A. Data ..................................................................................................................................... 12
B. Weighting ............................................................................................................................ 14
4. Household Wealth and Homeownership Rates ................................................................................ 15
A. Household Wealth ............................................................................................................... 15
B. Homeownership Rates ......................................................................................................... 15
C. Transition Rates ................................................................................................................... 16
5. Empirical Strategy ............................................................................................................................ 17
A. Difference-In-Difference ..................................................................................................... 17
B. Treatment and Control States .............................................................................................. 19
6. Results .............................................................................................................................................. 20
A. All Households .................................................................................................................... 20
B. Urban vs Rural Households ................................................................................................. 21
7. Sensitivity and Robustness Checks .................................................................................................. 22
8. Conclusions and Discussion ............................................................................................................. 25
9. References ........................................................................................................................................ 27
10. Tables and Figures............................................................................................................................ 31
Appendix A: Description of Variables.................................................................................................... 40
Chapter 2
Do Potential Future Health Shocks Keep Older Americans from Using Their Housing Equity....... 42
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 43
2. Health Insurance for Retirees ........................................................................................................... 46
3. Data .................................................................................................................................................. 47
4. A Model of Housing Dynamics with Potential Future Health Shocks at Old Age .......................... 48
A. Demographics and Income .................................................................................................. 48
B. Housing ............................................................................................................................... 49
C. Individual’s Problem ........................................................................................................... 50

v

a. The First Stage ........................................................................................................... 52
b. The Second Stage ....................................................................................................... 53
c. The Third Stage .......................................................................................................... 53
D. Government ......................................................................................................................... 54
5. Equilibrium ....................................................................................................................................... 54
6. Calibration ........................................................................................................................................ 55
7. Results .............................................................................................................................................. 58
A. Economies with and without a Potential Health Crisis ....................................................... 59
B. Insurance Policy .................................................................................................................. 60
8. Sensitivity Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 62
9. Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................... 63
10. References ........................................................................................................................................ 65
11. Tables ............................................................................................................................................... 68
Chapter 3
Home Maintenance and Housing Disinvestment among Older Americans......................................... 71
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 72
2. Data .................................................................................................................................................. 75
3. Empirical Strategy ............................................................................................................................ 78
4. Age Profile of Household Investment in Maintenance..................................................................... 80
A. Annual Household Spending on Home Maintenance.......................................................... 80
B. Annual Household Time Spent on Home Maintenance ...................................................... 81
C. Valuating Time Spent on Home Maintenance .................................................................... 82
D. Total Value of Disinvestment .............................................................................................. 83
5. Appreciation of House Values for Older Americans ........................................................................ 85
6. Discussion and Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 86
7. References ........................................................................................................................................ 88
8. Tables and Figures............................................................................................................................ 92
Appendix A: Description of Variables.................................................................................................. 105
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 107

vi

Introduction
The Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) suggests that households plan their income and
savings throughout their lifetime by saving during their working years and then living off of
those savings plus accumulated return in retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). Many
households do not always behave as the LCH would suggest. One such way is the use of
housing equity in retirement. According to the US Census Bureau, nearly 80 percent of retirees
own a house and housing equity accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired Americans
(Moulton et al. 2016). With housing equity making up such a large portion of many Americans
savings portfolios, the LCH suggests that retirees would extract this equity to help increase
consumption in retirement. Homeowners can extract housing equity by downsizing, moving
from owning to renting, or taking out a reverse mortgage. However, there is little evidence that
households have historically behaved this way and often die with large amounts of housing
equity.(Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti and Wise 1989, 1990, 2001, 2004; Ai et al. 1990;
Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007). Less than 10 percent of homeowners move
each year, and those that do are just as likely to upsize their home as they are to downsize (Venti
and Wise 1989, 2001, 2004; Feinstein and McFadden 1989). Most households seem to want to
remain in their home during retirement, yet, they do not extract equity through a reverse
mortgage. Only around 2 percent of retirees possess a reverse mortgage and households often
are not aware of them or what they entail (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017; Davidoff, Gerhard,
and Post 2017; Kutty 1998).
One of the more intuitive explanations for why retirees are not using their housing equity
to increase consumption is their intention to leave their house as a bequest to their children.
However, previous research has shown that this is a poor explanation as most homeowners do
not behave in a manner consistent with leaving the house as a bequest (Hurd 1992; Venti and
1

Wise 1989; Hoynes and McFadden 1997). The chapters in this dissertation build on prior
research analyzing how older Americans are (or are not) using their housing equity to increase
consumption in retirement.
In Chapter 1 I analyze how the Great Recession affected homeownership and moving
rates for households that had a guaranteed source of income from a defined benefit plan
compared to households that had a defined contribution plan. Using a difference-in-difference
analysis, I find that households with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely
to own a home following the Great Recession. This was largely concentrated in urban
households and households that had at least one person working. The results found in this
chapter are important to help future generations of retirees understand the changing role of home
equity in retirement planning as future retirees.
In Chapter 2 I use a heterogeneous overlapping generations model to determine if
households are not using their housing equity because they are engaging in precautionary
savings, where they would sell their home to pay of potential increases in medical bills in their
late retirement years. I find that if households knew they would not have to pay out-of-pocket
medical expenses from a health shock, there would be a 13-percentage point decrease in the
number households who own a home indicating they would be willing to forgo owning a home
in favor of renting. I show some households are engaging in precautionary savings and with
more adequate health insurance, these retirees would be more willing to act as expected per the
LCH regarding downsizing and moving.
The fist two chapters explore reasons why homeowners are not extracting equity by
moving; however, it appears that a majority homeowners want to remain in their home during
retirement (Venti and Wise 2004; Munnell, Soto, and Aubry 2007). In Chapter 3 I investigate
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how older homeowners who choose to stay in their home may be extracting equity by forgoing
investment in home maintenance. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) show that retirees offset a decrease
in food expenditure with an increase in time spent at home on food preparation. I find that a
similar model with spending on home maintenance does not follow this pattern. I show the
importance of including time spent on home maintenance in studies of this nature and that
households decrease both time and spending on home maintenance. Households over age 75
invest between $1,388-$1,999 less per year and see their homes appreciate 1.5-1.9 percent
slower each year than households between the ages of 50 and 74. While it does appear that
households are extracting some equity as they age by forgoing home maintenance. I also show
that households could extract higher amounts of equity by taking out a reverse mortgage.
The purpose of this dissertation is to further understand the choices of older Americas
regarding their use of housing equity. The findings shown in this dissertation help understand
these choices. This information will help individuals make more informed financial decisions as
the plan and prepare for retirement. It will also help policymakers in crafting policy for the 21st
century.
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Chapter 1
Defined Benefit Pensions and Homeownership in the Post-Great Recession
Era
Abstract: While housing equity accounts for a large portion of many retiree’s savings portfolios,
they are not using their equity to increase consumption in retirement as suggested by the LifeCycle Hypothesis. Defined benefit plans provide a guaranteed source of income in retirement
where the household bears no risk, whereas households with a defined contribution plan are subject
to potential risk depending on their asset allocation. This paper examines whether having a defined
benefit plan mitigated some of the effects of the Great Recession. Using a difference-in-difference
analysis, I examine the impact of the Great Recession on homeownership between households with
a defined benefit plan compared to those with a defined contribution plan. I find that households
with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a home after the Great
Recession compared to households with a defined contribution plan. It is possible that households
with defined contribution plans were willing to forgo homeownership to offset some of the losses
experienced from the Great Recession. Future retirees face a potentially risker housing market
and are less likely to have a defined benefit plan. As a result, future retirees may be more willing
to use their housing equity to increase consumption in retirement than was observed in past
generations.
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1. Introduction
Owning a house has historically been a viewed as a safe investment receiving an average
rate of return around 5 percent per year (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC). While it does not
receive a rate of return as high as the stock market (over 7% seen in the S&P 500 (Yahoo
Finance)), there has been relatively low volatility in housing prices, which have tended to
increase each year. As a result, nearly 80 percent of retirees own a house according the US
Census Bureau (2018) and housing equity accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired
Americans (Moulton et al. 2016). The Great Recession of 2007-2009 was one of the most severe
economic downturns in American history and was unique among recent recessions due to
simultaneous shocks in the labor, stock, and housing markets. During the recession, the S&P
500 averaged a 2.3 percent monthly decline (Yahoo Finance), unemployment rose from 5.0
percent to 9.5 percent (US Bureau of Labor Statistics), and the Case-Shiller Index averaged a 9.1
percent decline (S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC). Many older Americans (age 55 and older) saw a
decline in home value simultaneous with a reduction in their retirement portfolios or income for
those still working.
The Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) suggests that households plan their consumption and
savings paths throughout their lifetime by saving throughout their working years and then living
off those savings plus return in retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). Because housing
equity constitutes a large part of a many retiree’s savings portfolios, the LCH suggest that they
should use their accumulated housing equity to increase consumption in retirement. However,
prior to the Great Recession this was not usually the case, as many households die while still
owning large positive housing equity1 (Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Ai et

1

Section 2 provides background information on the housing-equity puzzle.
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al. 1990; Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007; Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti
and Wise 1989, 1990, 2001, 2004). With house values declining during the Great Recession, it
is possible home ownership is no longer seen as the safe investment it once was and some
households may choose to store their wealth elsewhere.
Over the last 30 years, American employers have shifted away from defined benefit plans
in favor of defined contribution plans (Butrica et al. 2009; Hurd and Rohwedder 2010). Defined
benefit plans are managed by the employer, who bear all the risk, and provide a guaranteed
source of income in retirement for the remainder of the employee’s life based on years of
service2. Defined contribution plans – such as an employee sponsored 401(k) or 403(b) – are
managed by the employee, who bears all the risk, and receive contributions from the employer.
Defined contribution plans often carry more risk than defined benefit plans as they are sensitive
to the portfolio and asset allocations the employee makes (Poterba et al. 2006). Thus, without
the guaranteed income provided by a defined benefit plan, older (for the purpose of this paper,
those age 55+ and in their late working years) and retired households (generally age 65+) were
subject to greater losses in savings and wealth during the Great Recession. In this paper, I
explore the role of defined benefit plans in homeownership after the Great Recession.
Specifically, I examine whether households that had a defined contribution plan were willing to
extract housing equity by foregoing homeownership and opting to rent instead, to offset some of
these losses. Using the Health and Retirement Study, I analyze how homeownership rates have
changed since the Great Recession based on age and pension status. Because the Great

2

Defined benefit plans vary in terms from employer to employer as to how much income they get, when
beneficiaries are eligible to start collecting, and whether the pension can be passed on to a spouse in the event of
death.
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Recession had a varying impact for different regions of the country, I also analyze
homeownership rates for households in urban and rural areas.
I find that while all households saw losses in non-housing related wealth following the
recession, households with a defined contribution plans saw a significant decrease in
homeownership rates compared to those that had a defined benefit plan. A difference-indifference analysis shows households with defined contribution plans were 2.1-2.9 percent less
likely to own a home following the Great Recession compared to households with a defined
benefit plan, which saw little or no change in homeownership. I find this change to be largely
concentrated in households where at least one person is working and residing in urban
households, as homeownership rates of rural households appear to not be affected by the Great
Recession.
Results of this study suggest that households with a defined contribution plan were less
likely to own a home after the Great Recession compared to households with a defined benefit
plan, who had a guaranteed income. While other explanations cannot be entirely ruled out, it is
possible these households chose to reconsider the role the house played in their savings portfolio
as more older households with defined contribution plans were more likely to act as would be
expected per the LCH. This is important because households under age 65 are significantly less
likely to have a defined benefit plan than older retirees. The decline housing values during the
Great Recession indicate that they may not behave as they did in past decades, and that housing
equity may indeed carry some risk. Future retirees will be increasingly likely to have large parts
of their savings portfolios in risky assets without the guaranteed income from a defined benefit
plan. The results of this paper are important to help future generations of retirees understand the
changing role of home equity in retirement planning so that they may act accordingly. These
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results also help policymakers understand the changing dynamics of retirees’ savings decisions
and will help shape policy for the 21st century.
My findings make several contributions to the literature on the use of housing equity as
households age. First, it provides an in-depth analysis of home ownership and transition rates for
older Americans in the post-Great Recession era. This complements earlier studies done by
Feinstein and McFadden (1989), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011), Venti and Wise (1989, 1990,
2001, 2004), and others. Second, this is one of the first papers to analyze the impact of pension
plans on homeownership after the Great Recession. It provides new insights into how a defined
benefit plan may influence how older Americans use their housing equity in retirement –
something not observed before the Great Recession.
The next section proceeds with a discussion on the use of housing equity by older
Americans in Section 2; Section 3 provides a description of the data and weighting; Section 4
discusses wealth, homeownership, and moving rates of older Americans before after the Great
Recession; Section 5 lays out the empirical strategy used in this paper; Section 6 presents and
discusses the results; Section 7 offers sensitivity analysis and robustness checks; and Section 8
offers concluding remarks.
2. The Use of Housing Equity by Older Americans
The LCH suggests that households should extract their housing equity in retirement to
supplement their savings and social security to help increase consumption spending. Households
can achieve this in one of three ways: downsizing to a smaller home, moving from owning to
renting, or taking out a reverse mortgage. In fact, households over age 65 could increase their
median income by as much as 40 percent if they sold their home and annuitized the money from
the sale (Butrica and Mudrazija 2016). However, historically only around 2-9 percent of
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homeowners move in a given year (Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Venti and Wise 2001, 2004,
1989). Since so many homeowners stay in their home, a reverse mortgage is an option that
allows them to extract housing equity without moving, however only around 2 percent of retirees
possess a reverse mortgage (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017; National Retirement Risk Index
2010). Some research suggests households do not appear to be aware of reverse mortgages or
what they entail (Davidoff, Gerhard, and Post 2017; Kutty 1998; Venti and Wise 1990, 2004).
Since the LCH indicates that homeowners should want to use their housing equity, an effort has
been made to understand why many do not. Some possible reasons include bequests,
precautionary savings, and non-economic reasons.
Past research has suggested that households may choose to forgo using equity in the
house in order to leave it as a bequest (Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Hurd 1992). However,
Hurd (1992) found no evidence to support a bequest motive because the consumption and
savings paths are almost identical for homeowners who are parents and nonparents. He suggests
that if there was a bequest motive then there should be a higher savings path for parents than
nonparents, which was not the case. Venti and Wise (1989) also noted that the change in
housing equity is the same for older homeowners regardless of parental status, suggesting that a
bequest is not the main explanation for reluctance to use housing equity. Fisher et al. (2007)
noted that if bequests were the motive, older Americans might treat their home as another part of
their total financial portfolio, however, Hoynes and McFadden (1997) show that as house value
increases, household total savings do not. Despite its intuitive appeal, there is no strong evidence
to support a prospective bequest as a driving force behind not extracting housing equity in
retirement.

10

Another possible explanation is that older Americans treat their house as a form of
precautionary savings in the event of unexpected medical costs (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011;
Venti and Wise 2001; Nakajima and Telyukova 2017). One of the biggest consumption
expenditures of older Americans is long-term care. Given the uncertainty of if or when longterm care will become necessary, the house can serve as a form of precautionary savings to serve
as a form of insurance to provide funds if needed (Fisher et al. 2007). Murray (2018) explores
this explanation and finds that precautionary savings indeed accounts for up to 13 percent of
households holding on to their housing equity.
A final theory is that as people age, they are less likely to view the house as an asset.
Socioemotional Selective Theory (SST) is a lifespan theory of motivation popular in psychology
that proposes that people monitor time horizons and adjust motivations, goals, and preferences as
they age. Older people are more likely to perceive time as finite. Thus, they may place more
importance on finding emotional meaning and satisfaction from life while investing fewer
resources into gathering information and expanding horizons (Carstensen 2006). Fisher et al.
(2007) noted that if this is the case, older Americans may hold on to their home because they are
more driven by emotional attachment than financial gain. However, a reverse mortgage would
allow a household to remain in their home and extract equity and satisfy both the LCH and SST.
In this paper, I explore an alternative explanation that was not observed prior to the Great
Recession. Defined benefit plans are less common for recent retirees and those who are about to
retire compared to older generations on whom many previous studies were conducted. In
addition, the coinciding losses in wealth and house value during the Great Recession provides a
unique opportunity to examine how having the guaranteed income from a defined benefit plan
may have mitigated these losses compared to other households. The potential willingness of
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some households with a defined contribution plan to part with their housing equity after the
Great Recession shows how a defined benefit plan may have influenced the historical decision of
so many older Americans to not use their housing equity to increase consumption in retirement.
It is possible that due to having a guaranteed source of income from a defined benefit plan,
households never considered the house when making retirement decisions. Households with
defined contribution plans in a potentially risker housing market may be more willing to do so.
3. Data and Weighting
A. Data
This paper uses individual and household level data from eight waves of the restricted
version of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) from 1998-2014 to study homeownership
before and after the Great Recession. The HRS is a longitudinal survey that includes about
20,000 households over age 50, representative of the overall United States population in that age
group. The HRS defines an observational unit as an eligible household containing at least one
person born within a given time period (which varies by phase)3. The HRS is administered by the
University of Michigan Institute for Social Research in partnership with the RAND Center for
the Study of Aging. The original target population for the HRS when the study was initiated in
1992 is adults born between 1931-1941 (designated ‘HRS Cohort’) and those born before 1924
(AHEAD cohort). Every six years the survey adds a new cohort starting in 1998 with those born
between 1924-1930 (Children of the Depression) and 1942-1947 (War Babies Cohort). In 2004
those born between 1948-1953 (Early Baby Boomers Cohort) were added; and the last group
added was in 2010 with the addition of those born between 1954-1959 (Mid-Baby Boomers
Cohort).

3

For more information on the HRS and its sample selection, see https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/publications/biblio/9047
(HRS Staff, 2008).
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This study uses the HRS due to its specific focus on older Americans. While much of the
research on housing uses the American Housing Survey, the HRS includes more information on
retirement plans, asset composition, and spending in addition to demographical and housing
characteristics, making it more appealing for this study.
This study restricts attention to two household types: those consisting of either one
person aged 55 or older or a married couple where the male is aged 55 or older4. Urban and rural
households are determined by the United States Department of Agriculture Rural-Urban
Continuum Codes5 included in the HRS. Metropolitan areas are classified as urban and nonmetropolitan areas rural. All monetary values in the HRS are reported in nominal dollars and
have been converted into real 2009 dollars using the PCE chain-type price index taken from the
Federal Reserve Economic Database6.
I use several key variables in this paper. The first is whether or not a household has a
defined benefit plan. I construct an indicator variable using two metrics from the HRS. The
HRS provides a variable for how much each person in the household is receiving from an
employer pension annually. This is then constructed into a household variable by combining
pension income if the household contains two people. If the household reports receiving pension
income from the employer, then the indicator variable takes a value of one; if they reported
receiving no pension income from the employer, this variable takes a value of zero. This study
also includes households in their late working years who may not be collecting this income yet.
In these cases, the HRS has information on whether or not they have a defined benefit plan from

4

This study allows for divorced and widowed households and would fall under a household with one person.
More information on the USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Codes are available at https://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/rural-urban-continuum-codes/.
6
Downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPI) on 5/13/2017
(US Bureau of Economic Analysis)
5
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their current job. If they are working and have a defined benefit plan, then the indicator variable
takes a value of one; if they are working and do not have a defined benefit plan, then it takes a
value of zero.
I also construct an indicator variable for households that have a defined contribution plan
while not having a defined benefit plan. The HRS provides a variable for the value of
households defined contribution plans. I sum value for all the plans of the household. Since
some households may extract the total value of their defined contribution plan, this variable takes
the value of one if the household at any time reported a positive value for their defined
contribution plans conditional on not also having a defined benefit plan, and a zero otherwise.
Non-housing wealth is defined as total household assets less household debt excluding
the value of the primary residence, mortgages, and home loans. Income is defined as total
household income and includes earnings, pension income, social security, and others. A detailed
breakdown of the variables used in this analysis and how they were constructed can be found in
Appendix A.
B. Weighting
Because the age distribution of the respondents of the research sample changes from
wave to wave because to households exit and enter the survey, inverse probability weights are
constructed for each age group and applied to all analyses in this paper7. The weight is based on
the first year in the sample and constructed as follows:

 # of individuals age i in 1998 
weight = 

 # of individuals age i in year x 

7

−1

(1)

A sensitivity check is conducted in section 7 to explore the results without the weights
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4. Household Wealth and Homeownership Rates
A. Household Wealth
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Following the Great Recession, many households saw declines in their non-housing
wealth. Table 1 shows that households with a defined benefit plan experienced a 5.5 percent
decline in non-housing wealth compared to a 31.4 percent decline for households with a defined
contribution plan. Households with a defined benefit plan aged 65 and older saw no decline in
non-housing wealth after the Great Recession whereas households with a defined contribution
plan did. Households age 65 and over are more than twice as likely to have a defined benefit plan
as those aged 55-64 and that younger households are more likely to have a defined contribution
plan. This is consistent with studies by Buessing and Soto (2006), Copeland (2006), and
Wiatrowski (2004) that show that employers offering defined benefit plans have been on the
decline over the last 30 years.

B. Homeownership Rates
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 2 shows homeownership rates for all households before and after the Great
Recession and for households with both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. Overall,
there was a 4-percentage point decline in homeownership rates following the recession. This is
largely concentrated in households with defined contribution plans. These households saw
declines in homeownership at all age groups and an increase in the rate of renting compared to
households with a defined benefit plan. Households with a defined benefit plan saw modest or
no declines in homeownership rates.
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Households with a defined benefit plan tend to be concentrated among those already
retired at the time of the Great Recession and they did not suffer as much as those between the
ages of 55-64 and nearing retirement. However, those at all ages with defined contribution plans
saw declines in non-housing wealth and a decrease in homeownership rates following the Great
Recession. The declines in homeownership rates could be driven by a desire to use their housing
equity to offset losses in retirement savings or they could no longer afford the mortgage. Since
homeownership may no longer be considered as safe an asset as in prior decades, households
may be storing more of their wealth in other assets.
C. Transition Rates
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 shows the transition rates8 for households that moved for all households and
households with and without a defined benefit plan. There was a 2.2-percentage point decrease
in the percent of older households that moved following the Great Recession. For homeowners,
there was a 13.8-percentage point decrease in the percent who moved from owning to owning
and a corresponding 14.9-percentage point increase in the percent who moved from owning to
renting. The change in moving for renters was relatively small compared to that for
homeowners. Homeowners in the 55-64 age group saw a 15.7-percentage point decrease in the
rate of homeowners moving to owning, the largest of all the age groups. Those aged 65-74 saw a
9.7-percentage point decline in moving from owning to owning and households aged 75-84 saw
the smallest decline at 6.7-percentage points. A smaller number of households moved after the

8

The transition rates in Table 3 are of the same format seen in Feinstein and McFadden (1989) and Venti and Wise
(1989). Where is says own/rent in the column that represents the current residence. This table is to be read across
showing the number of owners/renters, the percent of owners/renters that moved and the percent that moved to
owning and the percent that moved to renting
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Great Recession but out of those who did, they were more likely to move to renting and forgo
homeownership.
Table 3 also shows this breakdown for households with both defined benefit and defined
contribution plans. The percent of older households that move after the Great Recession is
relatively similar for households with defined benefit and defined contribution plans. The
percent of households who moved from owning to owning declined 13.1-percentage points for
households with a defined benefit plan, and is largely concentrated among households aged 5564 and corresponds to the only age group that saw a modest decline in homeownership in Table
2. The percent of households who moved from owning to owning declined 17.8-percentage
points for households with defined contribution plans and this decline occurred at all ages,
corresponding to a drop in homeownership rates at all ages for this group shown in Table 2.
In summary, pre-retirement age households are less likely to have defined benefit plans
than older and retired households and more likely to have defined contribution plans.
Households with defined contribution plans saw more significant changes in homeownership
than households with defined benefit plans. This will be further analyzed using regression
analysis.
5. Empirical Strategy
A. Difference-In-Difference
I use a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to measure the effect of the Great
Recession on homeownership for households with and without defined benefit plans using the
following regression:

prob(homeownershipit = 1| X ) = 0 + 1DCit + 2 Postt + 3 DCit Postt +  'X it + i + t +  it

(2)
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The dependent variable representing homeownership status for household i at time t and is an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the household reports owning a house and a zero if they
report renting or other9. DCit is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the household has a
defined contribution plan and is equal to zero if they have a defined benefit plan. Postt is an
indicator variable that is equal to one in the years after the Great Recession (2010-2014). The
coefficient of interest is  3 , which captures the effect of the Great Recession on homeownership.
I expect this value to be negative if households without a defined benefit plan were less likely
than those with one to own a house following the Great Recession.
The demographic controls included in the vector X it are as follows: inverse hyperbolic
sine (IHS) of income, lagged IHS of non-housing wealth, an indicator for marital status, an
indicator for being unemployed, years of education, number of children, age, and age squared.

i represents state fixed effects and  t represents year fixed effects. The IHS is used in place of
logged values to incorporate zero and negative values10. Table 4 shows the means and
differences of observable characteristics for households with defined benefit and defined
contribution plans separated by the treatment period.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Since the Great Recession had varying impacts on different parts of the country, I split
the sample into urban and rural households to test for heterogeneous effects across geographic
areas. For this purpose, equation (2) was re-estimated for urban and rural households
independently.

The HRS has a third category for living in “other.” This includes such scenarios as living in a recreational vehicle,
living with parents rent free, and other types of residential situations besides home ownership and renting
10
See Burbidge, Magee, and Robb (1988) and Pence (2006) for derivation and use of the IHS transformation.
9
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B. Treatment and Control States
Homeownership rates for households with a defined contribution plan appear to have
been more affected by the Great Recession and serve as the treatment group. Defined benefit
plans are the complement to a defined contribution plan and serve as the control group. In
equation (2),  3 represents the effect of the Great Recession on homeownership status for
households without a defined benefit plan. The interpretation of  3 as the causal effect of the
Great Recession on homeownership status requires two assumptions. First, the decision to own a
home should be exogenous to other policies or observable factors. For this assumption to be
true, in the absence of the Great Recession the difference in homeownership trends for
households with and without a defined benefit plan should be similar before and after 2010.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Table 5 shows a balance test to determine if there were changes in observable characteristics
before and after the Great Recession. For each demographic variable, I estimate a variation of
equation (2) with each control as the dependent variable without the other control variables. This
test shows that some of the demographic variables, including non-housing wealth and children,
have statistically significant changes after the Great Recession. While such factors might
influence the decision to own a home, when adding these controls into the estimation, the
baseline results (shown in the next section) do not fluctuate significantly. Since there is
imbalance, I conduct an analysis outlined in Oster (2017) to include bounds on the treatment
effect to show these results can serve as an upper bound. While it is not impossible to rule out
other causes, this eases the concern that the results might be driven by other factors.
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Second, the interpretation of  3 as causal requires the outcomes in the treated and control
groups to follow parallel trends prior to the Great Recession. I asses the validity of this
assumption in two ways. First, the homeownership rates for both groups are visually graphed in
Figure 1. Prior to 2010, homeownership rates between the two groups had the same general
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
trend. Following 2010, households with a defined benefit plan continue the same trend while
households without show a decline. A trendline is included to show the trend had it not changed
after the Great Recession. Second, I test this assumption by interacting a linear time trend
( Trendt ) with the treatment variable, restricting the period to 1998-2008, and estimating the
following regression equation while including the same controls as in equation (2):

prob(homeownershipit = 1| X ) = 0 + 1DCit + 2Trendt DCit +  'X it + i + t +  it

(3)

If the treatment and control groups have similar trends prior to the Great Recession, then  2 in
equation (3) should be small and statistically insignificant. Table 6 presents the results of
equation (3) for all households, urban households, and rural households.  2 is small and
statistically insignificant for all three models providing evidence of parallel trends prior to the
Great Recession.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
6. Results
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
A. All Households
Table 7 shows the results from difference-in-difference regression depicted in equation
(2). Column 1 shows the regression outline in equation (2) without controls and, in Column 2, I
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add demographic controls to ensure they do not impact the results. Column 1 indicates that
households with a defined contribution plan were 2.9 percent less likely to own a home after the
Great Recession than households with a defined contribution plan, an effect that is statistically
significant at the one percent level. Column 2 shows that when including demographic controls,
the effect decreases to 2.1 percent, but remains statistically significant at the five percent level.
This eases the concern that the results might have been driven by changes in income, nonhousing wealth, or other factors. A sensitivity analysis is conducted in Section 7 to show that
these results are robust to observation changes due to adding controls. These estimates show that
the Great Recession influenced housing decisions among households with a defined contribution
plan, but no corresponding effect was seen on households with a defined benefit plan. It appears
that having a defined benefit plan as a guaranteed source of income provided security against
losses they may have suffered that households with a defined contribution plan did not have.
B. Urban vs Rural Households
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 show the results from difference-in-difference regressions
when the sample is restricted to just urban households. Column 3 shows the results without
demographic controls and Column 4 shows the results with demographic controls. Column 3
shows that urban households with a defined contribution plan were 3.3 percent less likely to own
a house than their urban counterparts with a defined benefit plan. This effect is statistically
significant at the one percent level. This percentage falls to 2.6 percent when adding controls, as
seen in Column 4, and remains significant at the one percent level. The small changes seen
when adding controls again ease the concern about other factors driving the results.
Columns 5 and 6 show the results from the difference-in-difference regressions when the
sample is restricted to just rural households. Column 5 does not include demographic controls
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and Column 6 does. None of the results are statistically significant, suggesting that the Great
Recession did not impact homeownership for rural households the way it did urban households.
This is a trend seen in other studies showing that urban households were affected more severely
by the Great Recession than their rural counterparts (Thiede and Monnat 2016; Mattingly, Smith,
and Bean 2011). Bailey, Jenson, and Ransom (2014) note that many rural areas were already
suffering with a troubled labor market due to lower levels of education and aging populations,
perhaps because the decline in the manufacturing sector had already produced economic
hardships in these areas (Slack 2014). The fact that rural households did not experience the same
economic decline as urban households likely explains why the lack of significant change in
homeownership differential between households with and without defined benefit plans.
7. Sensitivity and Robustness Checks
[INSERT TABLE 8a HERE]
To ensure that the changing sample from adding controls is not what is influencing the
coefficient change, I re-estimate the results from Table 6 Column 1 but restrict it to the sample
found in Column 2. The results of this are shown in Panel A of Table 8a. The treatment effect
decrease by 0.3 percentage points showing that households with a defined contribution plan are
3.2 percent less likely to own a house after the Great Recession compared to households with a
defined benefit plan. This small change provides evidence the changing sample is not
influencing the results.
The HRS sample used in this study also incorporates the recession that started in March
2001 and ended in November 2001. There should be no impact on homeownership from this
recession since the impact of the housing market was unique to the Great Recession. To test this,
I re-estimate equation (2) with using the 2001 recession as the treatment period instead of 2008.
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The results of this regression are shown in Panel B of Table 8a and show that there was no
impact of homeownership for households without a defined benefit plan compared to those that
did have one. This provides further evidence that it was indeed the Great Recession that is
causing these results not just economic downturns in general.
Panel C of Table 9a shows the results of the difference-in-difference models without
using age weights mentioned in Section 3. The results without the weights are slightly more
negative but show the same trend as the results using the age weights. The age weights place
slightly more emphasis on older age groups to account for survival bias. The results being more
negative without weights makes sense because the Great Recession had a greater impact on
homeownership for those 55-64 compared to those 65 and older, and removing the age weights
gives the younger age group a larger share of the sample.
Due to the imbalance of observables, I cannot rule out the impact of unobservables on the
results, however it is possible to provide bounds on the treatment effect to show how the
unobservable might impact the results. Oster (2017) provides an extension to Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005), which outlines the procedure11. Oster (2017) shows that assuming the role of
observables is proportional to the role of observables in determine treatment effect, it is possible
to determine a bound on the treatment effect. If the bound does not include zero, this provides
information on the direction unobservable might influence the results. The bounds from this
procedure, using the Stata code accompanying Oster (2017), are shown in Panel D of Table 8a.
The bound on the treatment effect does not include zero for any of the regressions, suggesting
that the estimates shown in Table 6 may be an upper bound.

11

Several recent studies have incorporated this procedure including Baranov et al. (2015), Gunes and Tsaneva
(2016), and Ozier (2018),
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[INSERT TABLE 8b HERE]
In Table 8b I split the sample in two different ways to measure the impact of the Great
Recession on homeownership. In Panel A I restrict the sample so that at least one person in the
household is working. This shows that working households with a defined contribution plan
were 2.1 percent less likely to own a house after the Great Recession compared to households
with a defined benefit plan. Urban households with defined contribution plans were 2.3 percent
less likely to own a home following the Great Recession though only significant at the ten
percent level, and much like the full sample, there is no significant effect for rural households.
In Panel B I restrict the sample to households that are fully retired. The effect of having a
defined contribution plan is of similar magnitude as the full sample but is not statistically
significant. This is not unexpected as a large percentage of households that were already retired
at the time of the Great Recession had defined benefit plans (see Table 1) and those that did not,
had most likely started to adjust their portfolio away from stocks and risky assets once they hit
retirement (Fagereng, Gottlieb, and Guiso 2017). As such, they most likely did not see as severe
losses as pre-retirement households who still possessed risky assets. Hurd and Rohwedder
(2010) note that retirees were likely to suffer less than those who were in their late working
years. It is important to note that the number of Americans working past age 65 has been
increasing since the 1990s (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010; Kaul and Goodman 2017; Toosi 2015).
Therefore, this effect is not necessarily isolated to just households under age 65, but to
households that have not fully decided to retire. In summary, having a defined contribution plan
lead to a significant decrease in homeownership after the Great Recession compared to
households with a defined benefit plan, however this effect appears to be largely concentrated
among urban households where at least one person is working.
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These sensitivity and robustness checks show that the results are robust and most likely
not driven by unobservable factors and that they were indeed caused by the Great Recession.
8. Conclusions and Discussion
The Great Recession was one of the most severe economic downturns in contemporary
American history. Households experienced declines in income, savings, and property values.
For Americans that were retired or near retirement, these losses could be difficult if not
impossible to recover. Having a defined benefit plan may have possibly mitigated some of the
losses that may have been suffered in other assets. Households with defined contribution plans
saw losses in their retirement portfolio and wealth without the security that a defined benefit plan
provides. As a result, households with defined contribution plans saw larger declines in
homeownership compared to households with a defined benefit plan. Additionally, households
with defined contribution plans saw a larger decline in the amount of homeowners who moved
from owning to owning and a larger increase in the percent of homeowners who moved from
owning to renting. It is possible that in the future, homeownership may no longer be regarded as
the safe investment it once was; storing wealth in excess housing equity carries new risk. In
addition, an increasing number of households no longer have defined benefit plans and rely more
heavily on defined contribution plans. With much savings tied up in potentially more risky
assets, households with a defined contribution plan appear less likely to store wealth in housing
equity in retirement, needing it to maintain spending levels. This is a new phenomenon;
historically, many households have died with large sums of housing equity they could have used.
This paper provides some of the first evidence of the impact of the Great Recession upon
homeownership in the context of housing equity use by older Americans. I find that households
with a defined contribution plan were 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a house than those with a
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defined benefit plan after the Great Recession. By contrast, homeownership rates after the
recession were relatively unchanged for the latter group. Comparing this effect between urban
and rural areas, I find that this effect appears largely concentrated in urban areas where
households with a defined contribution plan were 2.6-3.3 percent less likely than those with a
defined benefit plan to own a home after the Great Recession. In households where at least one
person is working, households with a defined contribution plan were 2.1 percent less likely to
own a home after the recession compared to households with a defined benefit plan. No such
differential effect was found in rural areas or households that are fully retired, which is consistent
with other studies that show the impact of the Great Recession was more heavily concentrated in
urban areas and that older retirees are more likely to have defined benefit plans and less likely to
have risky assets which both mitigate the impact of the Great Recession.
In the post-Great Recession era, an increasing number of retirees are going to be living
off their accumulated savings in risky assets with defined benefit plans disappearing in favor of
defined contribution plans. Since house prices declined during the Great Recession, there is no
guarantee that housing prices will not decline again. Storing wealth in housing equity is now
potentially associated with some risk. It is likely that future retirees without defined benefit
plans, being unable to count on their home value always increasing, may reduce housing equity
and even forgo homeownership altogether, storing that wealth in other assets. Historically,
having a defined benefit plan gave households enough guaranteed income that they possibly
chose not to use the equity in their house even though they were able to do so. Future
households may not have this luxury. As America’s population ages and people live longer in
retirement, understanding how Americans finance their retirement – and how this will change in
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the future – is important as federal, state, and local policymakers look to shape policy for the 21st
century.
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10. Tables and Figures

Table 1. Household Wealth Before and After the Great Recession

Age
ALL

55-64

65-74

75-84

Median Income
Median Non-Housing Wealth
% with DB Plan
% with DC Plan
Median Income
Median Non-Housing Wealth
% with DB Plan
% with DC Plan
Median Income
Median Non-Housing Wealth
% with DB Plan
% with DC Plan
Median Income
Median Non-Housing Wealth
% with DB Plan
% with DC Plan

All Households
1998-2008 2010-2014
30,657
32,066
49,415
28,270
41.81
32.35
12.26
21.24
51,292
46,725
53,168
16,019
20.03
10.68
34.68
37.29
33,880
36,985
57,740
46,236
44.86
40.28
11.82
22.67
25,626
26,116
49,379
40,333
53.09
46.98
1.83
8.74

With DB Plan
1998-2008 2010-2014
38,452
41,888
92,575
87,454

With DC Plan
1998-2008 2010-2014
62,666
63,465
91,940
63,041

55,960
107,587

62,236
70,203

76,387
87,622

80,623
54,042

42,761
99,935

49,289
104,443

51,198
96,737

45,442
88,578

34,473
87,211

37,655
88,955

39,773
84,135

28,254
52,138

Note: Median income and non-housing wealth are reported in real 2009 dollars
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Table 2. Homeownership rates Before and After the Great Recession

Age
ALL
55-64
65-74
75-84

Own
Rent
Own
Rent
Own
Rent
Own
Rent

All Households
1998-2008
2010-2014
76.70
72.86
19.98
26.09
81.06
69.28
16.82
29.85
80.05
79.66
17.88
19.55
75.43
76.30
19.81
22.65

With DB Plan
1998-2008 2010-2014
83.86
82.85
13.57
16.21
91.40
87.10
7.31
12.17
88.4
89.06
10.30
10.28
81.04
83.08
15.06
16.29

With DC Plan
1998-2008 2010-2014
88.40
84.55
10.58
16.21
89.11
84.51
9.11
15.00
87.60
85.63
11.39
14.03
90.96
81.96
8.67
17.54

Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because the HRS includes a third option for homeownership called “other.”
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Table 3. Transition Rates for Households that Moved

AGE
ALL
55-64
65-74
75-84

ALL
55-64
65-74
75-84

Own
Rent
Own
Rent
Own
Rent
Own
Rent

N
41,246
9,628
14,212
2,789
15,403
3,239
9,313
2,261

Own
Rent
Own
Rent
Own
Rent
Own
Rent

13,462
4,317
5,912
2,298
3,776
845
2,934
837

All Households
% Move
Own
8.13
71.04
20.48
13.55
9.26
84.59
25.95
22.97
7.56
76.18
20.54
13.16
7.68
59.51
17.47
10.1
5.89
19.79
6.37
24.66
4.85
19.74
5.38
13.66

57.27
12.59
68.86
12.61
66.44
13.25
52.86
12.05

Rent
25.21
80.69
13.79
71.25
20.87
82.05
34.54
84.26

N
17,539
2,524
3,034
227
7,829
897
5,417
938

40.08
84.11
32.9
84.9
29.84
83.9
43.49
85.91

4,388
757
796
94
1,693
187
2,257
423

1998-2008
With DB Plan
% Move
Own
8.04
70.09
21.86
14.64
9.66
91.51
30.39
30.47
7.40
77.07
22.70
17.25
8.04
59.03
19.09
13.70
2010-2014
5.68
57.02
19.11
17.98
5.60
58.99
31.43
16.30
4.64
76.10
19.98
21.15
4.99
54.95
17.43
22.20

Rent
26.28
79.28
7.78
65.80
20.47
76.98
34.44
6.53

N
8,024
938
5,899
630
1,938
246
211
23

40.77
77.62
41.01
83.70
20.87
78.85
44.09
77.80

3,925
636
2,717
436
932
142
331
60

With DC Plan
% Move
Own
8.87
82.90
30.10
29.83
9.79
86.55
31.88
36.85
7.93
77.94
28.81
22.91
6.39
73.41
32.90
11.32
5.49
26.95
5.79
27.43
5.02
27.19
5.87
25.33

65.15
16.83
66.17
16.24
61.10
20.24
69.79
6.89

Rent
14.79
67.63
11.60
59.12
18.92
76.13
26.59
88.68
33.42
82.02
32.17
81.86
37.68
79.76
30.21
93.11

Note: Columns may not sum to 100% because the HRS includes a third option for homeownership called “other.” This table shows on the columns whether or not
the household is an owner or a renter and if they move, the percent that move to owning or renting for the rows. For example: For all households between 19982008, 8.13% of households that are current owners decided to move and 71.04% of them decided to move to owning and 25.21% decided to move to renting

33

Table 4. Summary Statistics by Treatment Group and Time Period

-1

sinh (Income)
sinh-1(Non-Housing Wealth)
Years of Education
Number of Children
Married
Unemployed
Age

Observations

Households with DB Pension
Pre
Post
Diff
11.29
11.38
-0.08***
(0.75)
(0.83)
10.87
10.50
0.37***
(4.84)
(5.88)
12.55
13.27
-0.72***
(2.89)
(2.79)
3.02
2.98
0.04
(2.02)
(2.00)
0.61
0.57
0.03***
(0.48)
(0.52)
0.01
0.02
-0.01***
(0.09)
(0.13)
73.92
75.67
-1.75***
(8.38)
(9.89)

Households with DC Pension
Pre
Post
Diff
11.68
11.59
0.09***
(1.14)
(1.47)
11.02
9.89
1.13***
(5.10)
(6.52)
13.24
13.65
-0.42***
(2.89)
(2.72)
3.16
2.82
0.33***
(1.96)
(1.80)
0.74
0.72
0.02***
(0.44)
(0.45)
0.03
0.05
-0.03***
(0.16)
(0.23)
63.95
64.06
-0.11
(5.71)
(7.51)

27,089

15,025

9,966

Diff in Diff
0.17
0.76
0.30
0.29
-0.01
-0.02
1.64

9,728

Note: The first two columns for each group provides the means and standard deviations for the treatment and control groups in the pre-period (1998-2008) and
the post period (2010-2014). The last column for each group provides the results from a t-test to see if there are significant differences between the treatment
and control in the pre-period. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Table 5. Balance Test
Dependent Variable
sinh-1 (Income)
sinh-1 (Non-Housing Wealth)
Years of Education
Number of Children
Married
Unemployed
Age

All Households

Urban

Rural

-0.176***
(0.027)
-0.778***
(0.140)
-0.260***
(0.070)
0.284***
(0.050)
0.011
(0.004)
-0.019***
(0.004)
-1.324***
(0.210)

-0.186***
(0.031)
-0.794***
(0.159)
-0.330***
(0.080)
-0.305***
(0.056)
0.018
(0.014)
0.021***
(0.004)
-1.570***
(0.234)

-0.175***
(0.050)
-0.524*
(0.277)
-0.071
(0.050)
-0.126
(0.112)
-0.013
(0.026)
0.009
(0.008)
0.114
(0.456)

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Each cell represents a separate
regression. Columns 1 includes the full sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to urban
households. Column 3 restricts the sample to rural households. All specifications include
state fixed effects and year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

Table 6. Test for Significant Pre-Trends

DC Plan X Time Trend

Observations
R

2

All Households
(1)
0.003
(0.003)

Urban
(2)
0.004
(0.003)

Rural
(3)
-0.005
(0.006)

31,111

25,597

5,514

0.148

0.154

0.145

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Controls include an indicator for
marital status, and indicator for being unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS
of income, lagged IHS of non-housing wealth, and state fixed effects. These regressions
were only run in the pre-period which is from 1998-2008.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Table 7. Estimation Results

DC Plan x Post-2008

All Households
(1)
(2)
-0.029***
-0.021**
(0.010)
(0.009)

Urban

Rural

(3)
-0.033***
(0.011)

(4)
-0.026***
(0.010)

(5)
-0.004
(0.021)

(6)
0.009
(0.020)

Observations

50,372

46,218

41,714

38,177

8,658

8,041

R2
Covariates

0.021
NO

0.164
YES

0.024
NO

0.152
YES

0.033
NO

0.149
YES

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Columns 1 and 2 include the full sample. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to urban
households. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to rural households. Controls include an indicator for marital status, and indicator for being
unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-housing wealth. All specifications include state fixed
effects and year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Table 8a. Sensitivity Checks
All Households
(1)

Urban
(2)

Rural
(3)

-0.032***
(0.010)

-0.037***
(0.011)

-0.002
(0.022)

46,218

38,177

8,041

0.021
NO

0.024
NO

0.033
NO

0.005
(0.010)

0.008
(0.011)

-0.004
(0.017)

Observations

46,218

38,177

8,041

R2
Covariates
Panel C: No Age Weights
DC Plan x Post-2008

0.164
YES

0.170
YES

0.159
YES

-0.024***
(0.008)

-0.027***
(0.009)

-0.002
(0.018)

46,563
0.157
YES

38,478
0.161
YES

8,085
0.158
YES

-0.029***
-0.021**

-0.033***
-0.026***

-0.004
0.009

[-0.051, -0.021]

[-0.067, -0.026]

[0.009, 0.027]

Panel A: Equal Observations with Controls
DC Plan x Post-2008

Observations
2

R
Covariates
Panel B: 2001 Recession as Treatment Period
DC Plan x Post-2002

Observations
R2
Covariates
Panel D: Coefficient Bounds
Without Controls
With Controls
Treatment Effect Bounds

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Panels A-C represent separate regressions. Panel A shows the same
regression in Table 7 Column 1 but restricted to the sample of Table 7 Column 2. Panel D shows the bounds on the treatment
effect suggested by Oster (2017) using the Stata code provided with the article. Columns 1 includes the full sample. Column 2
restricts the sample to urban households. Column 3 restricts the sample to rural households. Controls include an indicator for
marital status, and indicator for being unemployed, years of education, age, age squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of nonhousing wealth. All specifications include state fixed effects and year fixed effects.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

37

Table 8b. Sensitivity Checks
All
Households
(1)

Urban
(2)

Rural
(3)

-0.021**
(0.010)

-0.023*
(0.012)

-0.002
(0.023)

20,336

16,703

3,633

0.123
YES

0.130
YES

0.117
YES

-0.025
(0.017)

-0.029
(0.019)

-0.002
(0.034)

Observations

22,110

18,321

3,789

R2
Covariates

0.190
YES

0.195
YES

0.198
YES

Panel A: One Person in Household Working
DC Plan x Post-2008

Observations
2

R
Covariates
Panel B: Household Completely Retired
DC Plan x Post-2008

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the household level. Each panel represents a separate regression.
Columns 1 includes the full sample. Column 2 restricts the sample to urban households. Column 3 restricts the
sample to rural households. Controls include an indicator for marital status, years of education, age, age
squared, IHS of income, and lagged IHS of non-housing wealth. All specifications include state fixed effects
and year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Figure 1. Pre- and Post-Trends for Treatment and Control States
100%
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Home Ownership Rate

90%
85%
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75%

70%
65%
60%
55%
50%
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2014

Defined Contribution Plan

Note: The line in the figure is a two-period moving average trendline
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Appendix A: Description of Variables
Variables from the HRS are taken from two sources. The first is the Enhanced FAT files
compiled by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, which compiles the raw data from the
survey into one file for each wave making it easier to merge with other waves. The second is
from the RAND HRS data file. Developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on
Aging and the Social Security Administration, it is a cleaned file containing HRS data from all
waves of the survey (RAND HRS Data 2016). RAND takes the raw responses from the HRS –in
some cases, questions vary across waves – and combine them into a variable that is consistent
across waves.
Variable

Description

Household Residence

Household residence type comes from the enhanced FAT files where it
is self-reported whether a person owns, rents, lives in other, or
unknown. The “other” category means anything outside of owning or
renting, and the respondent is asked to specify. These specifications
include but are not limited to: an assisted living facility, retirement
facility, nursing home, motel, living rent-free with friends or family, and
recreational vehicle. This variable is split into a dummy variable that
takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports owning and a 0 if the
respondent reports renting or other. If it is unknown, the variable is
coded as missing.
Household income comes from the RAND HRS file and is a sum of all
the self-reported income to the household, which includes: individual
earnings, capital income, pension income, annuity income, social
security, other government transfers, and other household income.
Non-Housing Wealth comes from the RAND HRS file and is the sum of
the self-reported values of real estate excluding the primary residence,
vehicles, businesses, IRA accounts, stock value, checking accounts,
checkable deposits, bonds, and other savings minus household debt.
The Defined Benefit Plan indicator variable is created using two
variables from the RAND HRS File. The first is pension income and
the second is whether or not a pension is offered at the current job.
Pension income is reported separately for the respondent and the spouse,
these are combined to determining a total household value of pension
income. If either the respondent or the spouse report having a defined
benefit plan at their current job or the household reports receiving.

Household Income

Non-Housing Wealth

Defined Benefit Plan
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income from a defined benefit plan, the household is recorded as having
a defined benefit plan.
Defined Contribution Plan The Defined Contribution Plan indicator variable is creating using the
self-reported balance of their defined contribution accounts. There are
four variables that households can report. For each individual I sum
these four variables. I then sum across the household to get the total
value of defined contribution plans for the household. If a household
ever reported having a positive value in their defined contribution plan,
this variable takes a value of one. This variable takes a value of zero if
they do not or if they also report having a defined benefit plan.
Years of Education
Years of Education comes from the RAND HRS file.
Number of Children

Number of Children comes from the RAND HRS file.

Age

Age comes from the RAND HRS file. The household variable for age
is determined by the age of the male in married households and the age
of the individual in single households.
Marital Status comes from the RAND HRS file. This is a dummy
variable taking a value of 1 if they report they are married and a value of
0 for any other marital status.

Marital Status
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Chapter 2
Do Potential Future Health Shocks Keep Older Americans from Using Their
Housing Equity?
Abstract: Many retirees retain housing equity and do not utilize it to help finance spending on
consumption. In this paper, I examine how older Americans (age 55+) may engage in
precautionary savings where households would sell their house in the event they face an increase
in out-of-pocket medical expenses due to a health shock. Using a counterfactual experiment, I
find that older households are 13-percentage points less likely to own a home in their late
retirement years when they know they will not have any out-of-pocket medical expenses. This
indicates that many older households prefer not to own a home but choose to do so knowing they
may get sick and thus are engaging in precautionary savings using their house. I conduct a policy
experiment to examine how an insurance policy that would cover all out-of-pocket medical
expenses would impact home ownership. I find that when an insurance policy of this nature is
offered that costs four percent of income, the baseline economy has the same homeownership and
moving rates as the counterfactual experiment where households do not have to pay for out-ofpocket medical expenses. This suggests that if seniors had more adequate health care coverage,
they would be more willing to use the equity in their house to increase consumption in retirement.
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1. Introduction
With nearly 80 percent owning a home according to the US Census Bureau (2018),
housing equity accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired Americans (Moulton et al. 2016).
Households have housing equity that could be used to increase consumption in retirement, as is
the case with other investments such as stocks and bonds. While households could extract equity
from their home by taking out a reverse mortgage or moving, this typically is not the case.
Previous research has shown that 57 to 75 percent of households 65 and older will live alone in
their house after retirement with approximately 16 percent staying in that home until death
(Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992). Households tend not to adjust their housing
equity except in the event of a shock to the structure of the household such as divorce or the
death of a spouse (Ai et al. 1990; Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007; Poterba,
Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti and Wise 2001, 2004, 1989, 1990). This contradicts the predictions
of the Life-Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) which suggests that households save during their working
years and draw down those savings in retirement (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954).
As homeowners age, it becomes more difficult to borrow money. Therefore, they may
choose to engage in precautionary savings using their home and sell it to cover unexpected
medical bills (Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Nakajima and Telyukova 2013; Venti and Wise
2001; Stucki 2005; Fisher et al. 2007). In this paper, I explore how this option might preclude
such homeowners from using the equity in their home to increase consumption in retirement. I
construct a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the impact of an increase in
out-of-pocket medical expenses caused by potential health shocks in old age on the housing
choices of older Americans in their late working and retirement years.
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I model an economy that consists of overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents
who must make decisions in each period: whether to rent or buy, what size house or apartment to
inhabit, and how much to spend on consumption in each period. Agents can borrow (subject to a
loan-to-value constraint) or save in each period. In the model, homeowners must pay property
taxes and face transaction costs if they sell their homes. I show in Section 7 that this model
produces similar homeownership rates to data found in the Health and Retirement Study.
I start by modeling an economy where agents in late retirement (age 72-77) have a
chance of receiving a health shock where they incur out-of-pocket medical expenses that they are
forced to pay for through either their income or accumulated assets, including the home. Next, I
model an economy where agents know with certainty that they will not incur an increase in
medical bills and compare the housing choices of the two groups. When agents are certain they
are not at risk of an increase in medical bills, homeownership rates decrease by as much as 13percentage points after reaching age 72. There is also an increase in the rates of moving and in
changing from owning to renting. This indicates that households are using their home as a form
of precautionary savings. This notion is reinforced in a sensitivity analysis showing that for
higher rates of out-of-pocket medical expenses, rates of homeownership increase beyond what is
seen in the benchmark model.
Medicare only covers 65 percent of retiree’s medical bills (De Nardi et al. 2015).
Because of this, many retirees have some sort of supplemental health insurance and long-term
care insurance to help cover the additional costs that include coinsurance payments and
premiums. However, even with supplemental insurance, many retirees still face high out-ofpocket medical expenses, particularly as the need for long-term care arises after age 70. A more
thorough look at health insurance coverage for seniors and some of the costs they will encounter
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can be found in Section 2. With the possibility of incurring large out-of-pocket medical bills,
despite coverage from Medicare and supplemental insurance, it appears that households retain
excess housing equity as a form of precautionary savings. This raises questions to the adequacy
of the current health insurance structure for retirees. Considering this, I test the impact of an
insurance policy that would cover all out-of-pocket medical expenses, particularly focusing on
medical expenses incurred after age 71. This type of insurance frees up the equity in the house
to help finance consumption in retirement and allows households to act more in accordance with
the LCH. I find that if an insurance policy of this nature is offered, 12.8 percent of households
would be willing to purchase this insurance policy if the cost was four percent of household
income. With the inclusion of this policy along with a possible health shock, rates of
homeownership and moving look like the economy where agents know with certainty that they
will not incur an increase in medical bills. This suggests that if households do not have to worry
about saving for potential out-of-pocket medical costs, they would be more willing to use the
equity in their house to help finance consumption in retirement.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it supplements existing literature
that addresses the question of why so many Americans do not use their housing equity toward
consumption in retirement. Empirical studies, such as Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and
Kotlikoff (1992); Feinstein and McFadden (1989); Fisher et al. (2007); Hurd (1992); Poterba,
Venti, and Wise (2011); Venti and Wise (1989, 1990, 2001, 2004) and others, show that retirees
are not using their housing equity in accordance with the LCH and explore possible causes such
as precautionary savings, bequests, and high transaction costs. This paper uses an overlapping
generations model of housing and consumption to explore how households may engage in
precautionary savings using their house. This model complements the work of

45

Anagnostopoulos, Atesagaoglui, and Carceles-Poveda (2013); Davis and Heathcote (2005);
Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018); Fisher and Gervais (2011); Li and Yao (2007); Cocco
(2004) and others. While most of these investigations focus on the entire life cycle, this paper
restricts its focus to Americans age 55 and older.
2. Health Insurance for Retirees
Medicare provides health insurance to adults age 65 and older in the United States and
has several components1. Medicare Part A covers in-patient hospital visits, hospice care, and
some health care. Most households do not pay a premium for Part A because they paid enough
Medicare taxes while working, however, they are required to make coinsurance payments2.
Medicare Part B covers doctors’ visits, out-patient care, physical therapy, and some other health
care costs not covered by Part A. There is a monthly premium for Part B that is based on
adjusted-gross income and some services require a coinsurance payment once a deductible is
met3. Medicare Part D covers prescription drugs and comes with a monthly premium paid in
addition to the premium for Part B4. Medicare beneficiaries also have the option to enroll in a
Medicare Advantage Plan, also called Medicare Part C. These are private health insurance plans,
typically HMOs, that provide the same benefits covered by Part A and Part B5. 30 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans in 2014 (Cubanski et al.
2015).

1

Information on what Medicare covers and its various parts are available at:
https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers.
2
More information on costs for Medicare Part A is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicarecosts/part-a-costs
3
More information on costs for Medicare Part B is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/your-medicarecosts/part-b-costs
4
More information on costs for Medicare Part D is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/drug-coveragepart-d/costs-for-medicare-drug-coverage/monthly-premium-for-drug-plans
5
More information on Medicare Part C is available at: https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-changeplans/types-of-medicare-health-plans/medicare-advantage-plans
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Medicare covers 65 percent of the medical expenses of retirees (De Nardi et al. 2015).
The remaining 35 percent come from payments on premiums, deductibles, and other services not
covered by Medicare (e.g., long-term services and dental care). This causes many older
households to incur high out-of-pocket costs on health care (Cubanski et al. 2018). Because of
these costs, 86 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had some sort of supplemental health insurance
in 2010 (Cubanski et al. 2015). Supplemental insurance policies are available to individuals
enrolled in Medicare Part A and B and are sold by private health care companies. These plans
are highly regulated and require a monthly premium and cover some of the costs Medicare does
not cover. However, even with supplemental insurance many households still pay between
$4,000-$8,000 per year in out-of-pocket health care expenses (De Nardi et al. 2015; Cubanski et
al. 2015)
Between the ages of 70 and 90, out-of-pocket medical expenses more than double. This
is primarily driven by spending on long-term care and nursing home stay, which can cost around
$80,000 a year (De Nardi et al. 2015; Fisher et al. 2007). Given the uncertainty of when longterm care will be necessary, this is a possibility why households hold on to excess housing equity
as a form of precautionary savings. In this paper, I explore how using the house as precautionary
savings may change if retirees had these additional costs covered by insurance.
3. Data
Due to its specific focus on Americans in their late working and retirement years, I use the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS), to aid in the parameterization of the model and asses how
well the output fits the data. I use individual and household level data from ten waves of the
HRS from 1996-2014. The HRS is a longitudinal survey that includes about 20,000 households
over age 50 selected through a multi-stage probability sample design that is a sample of the
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United States population over age 50. This survey oversamples Black and Hispanic populations
to support research on racial and ethnic disparities and defines an observational unit as an
eligible household financial unit where at least one person is an eligible member the defined
cohorts6. The HRS is administered by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research in
partnership with the RAND Center for the Study of Aging. When the study was initiated in
1992, the original target population for the HRS was adults born between 1931-1941 (HRS
Cohort) and those born before 1924 (AHEAD cohort). Every six years the survey adds a new
cohort starting in 1998 with those born between 1924-1930 (Children of the Depression) and
1942-1947 (War Babies Cohort). In 2004 those born between 1948-1953 (Early Baby Boomers
Cohort) were added, and then lastly in 2010, those born between 1954-1959 (Mid-Baby Boomers
Cohort) were added.
I restrict the data to two household types: one-person households where the person is
aged 55 or older and two-person households of married couples where the male is aged 55 or
older7.
4. A Model of Housing Dynamics with Potential Health Shocks at Old Age
A. Demographics and Income
In a framework that is similar in nature to Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018) and
Gervais (2002), the economy is populated with overlapping generations of agents at three stages
of life, st {1, 2,3} . Agents work during the first stage (age 55-64) and are retired in the last two
stages (age 65-71 and 72-77 respectfully). In each period t , agents advance from one stage to

6

For more information on the HRS and its sample selection, see
https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/publications/biblio/9047 (HRS Staff 2008)
7
This includes divorced and widowed individuals
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the next with probability  s and spend another period in the current stage with probability 1 −  s .
When an agent dies, they are replaced by a new agent in the first stage of life.
During the first stage of life, labor income, yts , is given by log ( yts ) = log ( ws ) + et . The
term w s represents the wage profile of the individual and et represents an AR(1) stochastic
shock to income every period, given by et = et −1 +  t .  t is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance  2 and   1 , it captures the persistence of the stochastic component to labor
income. During the final two stages of life, individuals are retired and face a certain retirement
income that declines as they age. In the third stage of life, agents are subject to a possible health
shock, t , that is associated with unexpected medical bills that can potentially occur each period.
Agents are aware that there is a possible health shock in the future but do not know whether they
will receive one. Agents die with probability  3 in the third stage and are replaced by an agent
in the first stage. In stage 3, agents can potentially face immediate death (e.g., total acute
myocardial infarction), a long-term illness (e.g., cancer), or a one-time health shock (e.g., broken
bone).
B. Housing
Agents will be endowed with units of housing at time t = 0 which they will live in the
first period. After the first period, agents will have access to a mortgage market when
purchasing a home. If they purchase a home, they are required to make a down payment. If an
agent sells their home, they face transaction costs (e.g., realtor fees, moving costs, etc.).
Homeowners have to pay property taxes, Tt p =  tp pt ht , where  tp is the property tax rate and pt
is the price of a unit of housing. Renters do not have to pay property taxes. Households make
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decisions on consumption, housing arrangements, and their mortgage each period after observing
their income and whether they receive a health shock8.
In the background of the model, there are financial institutions that provide loans to
homeowners, hold residential rental capital, and pool individual’s deposits. These financial
institutions own all the rental housing units. In this model, housing stock is fixed at H .
Housing stock is equal to housing owned by individuals plus housing owned by the financial
institutions. Homeowners can either be savers – earning an interest rate of r d ; or borrowers in
the mortgage market facing a mortgage rate of r m . The interest payments on mortgages is tax
deductible.
C. Individuals Problem
Homeowners must pay a transaction cost if they choose to sell their home. Let ht be
exogenous the quantity of housing an agent has at time t . Let h rent be the set of house sizes
available to renters and h own be the sizes of homes available to owners. Let ht {h rent } indicate
an agent who is a renter and ht {hown } indicate an agent who is a homeowner. Transaction
costs, F (ht , ht +1 ) , are defined by
 p h if ht  {h own } and ht +1  ht
F (ht , ht +1 ) =  t t
otherwise
0

(2)

where  represents the proportion of the house value paid in transaction costs (e.g., real estate
agent fees, moving costs, etc.). Homeowners who move to a different size home must pay

8

In this paper, health shock refers to an increase in unexpected medical bills in the third stage of life.
While individuals can suffer health shocks at any age, this study is specifically interested in how an
increase unexpected medical bills after age 72 impacts homeownership decisions because this is where
households are likely to see the largest increases in out-of-pocket medical spending. See De Nardi et al.
(2015) for more information.
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transaction costs. I assume that a household who remains in the same size house did not move.
All renters who move do not pay the transaction cost.
Households can borrow against the value of their home (mortgage at +1 ) and are subject to
a loan-to-value constraint  , given by
at +1   pt ht +1 if ht +1 {hown }

(3)

Homeowners are not allowed to default on their mortgages. Renters do not have access
to the mortgage market and are only allowed to save. A negative mortgage represents savings
that receives interest rate r d
 r m if at +1  0
r= d
 r if at +1  0

(4)

Following Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018), this model implements progressive
income taxes and uses the tax function from Gouveia and Strauss (1994), which has the
following functional form:


−
Tt ( y ) =  y − y 0 + 2

i

(

(

)

)

−

1

1





(5)

where y is taxable income, and 0 ,1 ,2 are policy parameters on income taxes that
determine progressivity and level of taxes collected . Interest paid on mortgages, rat , and
property taxes, Tt p , are tax deductible and interest on savings is taxable. Taxable income during
the first stage of life is

(

y = max 0,  yt − rat − Tt p 

)

(6)
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For simplicity it is assumed that retirees do not pay income on their retirement income, but
property taxes and mortgage interest are still tax deductible. Taxable income for the last two
stages of life is

(

y = max 0, −rat − Tt p 

)

(7)

In the event an agent dies, the financial institution sells the house and distributes the net
assets of all the deceased agents in the form of an accidental bequest in the next period. This
bequest is denoted by qt . Homes have a depreciation rate of  . This can be viewed as the
maintenance and upkeep costs of living in a home that homeowners must pay.
In each period agents seek to maximize utility and face budget constraints which are a
function of current and future homeownership status. Agents derive utility from consumption
and housing. Agents maximize the utility from consumption and housing in each stage given by:
1− s

ct ht1−  
max u (ct , ht ) =
1− s

(8)

where  is the relative weight of housing and consumption and  s is relative risk aversion.
a. The First Stage
In the first stage, agents are considered working and receive income, yt1 , as well as a
bequest from the previous generation who just died, qt . Agents are endowed with housing h0
and can either be a homeowner or a renter depending on the value of h0 . After the initial period,
households can stay in their current residence or they can move. All homeowners who move
face transaction costs, Ft .

During the first stage, agents must decide between spending on

consumption, ct , and saving for the next period, at +1 . The first stage budget constraint is as
follows:
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ct + ht +1 − at +1 = yt1 + ht − Tt i − Tt p + qt − Ft
(1 −  ) pt ht

if ht  h own

0

if ht  h rent

ht = 

 pt ht +1

if ht +1  h own

rentt ht +1

if ht +1  h rent

ht +1 = 

(9)

(10)

(11)

The competitive market rental rate is determined by the financial institutions, which make zero
profit in equilibrium. The rental rate covers the depreciation expenditure, property taxes, and
mortgage interest payments:

rentt = ( r m +  +  tp ) pt

(12)

b. The Second Stage
All agents retire at the beginning of the second stage and they observe their income, yt2 .
Agents then make decisions on how much to spend on consumption, ct , and their choice of
dwelling, ht +1 . Households can stay in their current residence or they can move. Those who
purchase another home can choose to borrow against it in the mortgage market or save for the
next period, at +1 . The budget constraint in the second stage is as follows:

ct + ht +1 − at +1 = yt2 + ht + (1 + r )at − Tt i − Tt p − Ft

(13)

c. The Third Stage
At the beginning of each period in this stage, agents observe their income, yt3 and
unexpected medical bills as a result of a health shock, t . t occurs with probability d t which
takes a value of 1 if the agent receives a health shock and 0 if they do not, and can reoccur each
period. Agents must pay for their unexpected medical bills, either from current income,
accumulated savings, or by selling their home. Agents make decisions on how much to spend on
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consumption, ct , and type of preferred dwelling, ht , in light of the potential the health shock.
The third stage budget constraint for a household is:

ct + ht +1 − at +1 = yt3 − dt t + ht + (1 + r )at − Tt i − Tt p − Ft

(14)

At the end of the third stage agents die, however agents do not know when this will occur. Any
assets the agent does not consume are distributed as an accidental bequest to the first generation.
D. Government
It is assumed that the government has a balanced budget and finances its expenditures, Gt ,
with tax revenue collected through income and property taxes.
5. Equilibrium
Individuals at time t are heterogeneous with respect to life stages st , assets/mortgages at
,housing ht , and income yt . Let (e, e ') be the transition matrix for labor income;  ( s, s ') be the
transition matrix for life stages;  s ( ') be age dependent probability of a health shock; t
represent the state ( s, a, h, y ) faced by an agent at time t ; and V (  t ) be the maximized value of
the objective function at state t . The dynamic programming problem faced by individuals is
given by:
Vt (  ) = max u ( c, h ) +    ( s, s ')(e, e ') s ( ')Vt +1 (  ' )
c , h ', m '

s'

e'

(15)

'

subject to the constraints (2)-(14).
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of value functions Vt (  ) ; individual decision
rules for consumption goods, housing, and mortgages; a measure of agent types  t (  ) ; and the
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price of housing pt – assuming the sequence government policy 0 ,1 ,2 , tp



mortgage and deposit rates r m , r d
▪





t =0





t =0

and

are given – so that for all t :

Given the price of the house, interest rates on mortgages and deposits, and the
government policy, the dynamic programming problem is solved by the individual’s
decision rules.

▪

pt clears the housing market,





 t ()ht () = H , where ht () is the optimal housing

allocation resulting from the dynamic programming problem of the household.
▪

Accidental bequests are given by
qt =

 3  m,h;a  t (  ) (1 −  ) ( pt (  ) ht (  ) ) − (1 + r ) ( at (  ) ) 





 t (  ) yts

(16)

Death occurs (with probability  3 ) after agents in the third stage have made their
homeownership, mortgage, and savings decisions.
6. Calibration9
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The goal for the benchmark economy is to match the housing market of Americans aged
55 and older using data from the HRS. A summary of all the parameters used in the model can
be found in Table 1.

9

The MATLAB code used by Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018), available at
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/mac.20160327, was very helpful and parts of their code
served as a template for the calibration of this paper. The MATLAB code used for this paper is available
upon request
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In each life stage, s , agents face a probability  s of moving to life stage s + 1 .  s is set
so that on average, agents spend ten years in the first stage and six years in the last two life
stages. This makes the average life expectancy 77 years. The transition matrix for life stages is:
.90 .10 .00 
 ( s, s ') = .00 .83 .17 
.00 .00 .83 

(17)

The labor income process that is used in the model is calibrated in such a way so the
output from the model match homeownership rates of the HRS (future use of calibrated is
assumed for the same purpose). The idiosyncratic component of labor income, et = et −1 +  t , is
calibrated using the four-state Markov chain found in Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018).
The values of et are (-0.41, -0.10,0.10,0.41) and the transition matrix is:

.84
.16
(e, e ') = 
.00

.00

.16 .00 .00 
.64 .20 .00 
.20 .64 .16 

.00 .16 .84 

(18)

The tax function in equation 4 is calibrated to the US federal tax code.  1 determines the
progressivity of taxes and is estimated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) to take the value of 0.768.
They also estimate 0 to be 0.258. 2 is calibrated to be 0.5. Property tax rates in the US vary
between 0.28 percent (Hawaii) to 2.38 percent (New Jersey) (Walczak 2015), so  p is set in the
middle at 1.0 percent.
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The interest rate on mortgages, r m , is set to 4.05 percent10 and the interest rate on
deposits, r d , is set to 1.7 percent.11 The transaction cost of selling a home,  , is 10 percent.
This is slightly higher than what is seen in other studies modeling the entire life-cycle, but there
is some evidence to suggest that transaction costs are higher for older households (Venti and
Wise 1990; Ai et al. 1990; Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Feinstein and
McFadden 1989). Following Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel (2018), the maximum loan-tovalue parameter,  , is set to 80 percent. The depreciation rate,  , is set to 1.7 percent.12
The time period, t , is one year. The subjective time discount factor,  , is assumed to be
0.96, a value in line with what is commonly used in the literature. The 2016 Consumer
Expenditure Survey shows that non-housing consumption makes up 66.4 percent of a
household’s personal expenditure (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018), so the relative weight of
consumption and housing,  , is set at 0.66. This paper takes a slightly different approach to risk
aversion than typically seen in these types of models due to its specific focus on retirees and near
retirees. Risk Aversion,  s , takes the value of 5.0 in the first stage, 8.0 in the second stage, and
10.0 in the third stage. These rates are higher than what is traditionally found in the literature
and increasing with age. It is intentionally calibrated this way as the model does not simulate the
entire life cycle – only late working years and retirement and older individuals tend to have
higher degrees of risk aversion than working age individuals (Tymula et al. 2013; Ablert and
Duffy 2012).

10

The average rate on a 30-year fixed mortgage is 4.05 percent between 2010-2017 (Freddie Mac 2018)
The average one-year treasury rate from 2010-2017 is 0.38 percent (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 2018). However, this is a period of Quantitative Easing (QE). Since low interest rates will
not be the norm in the future, this paper uses the interest rate on deposits from Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and
Tuzel (2018), the expected standard as QE ends
12
The range of  is between 1.5 and 2.0 percent in De Nardi (2004), Imrohoroglu, Matoba, and Tuzel
(2018), and Nakajima and Telyukova (2017)
11
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I find that within the HRS for households aged 72-77, between 40-45 percent of
household’s report having a bad health as well as an increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses.
To determine bad health, I considered three metrics from the HRs: households that reported an
increase in health conditions, households that reported bad health, and households that reported
cancer, a stroke, lung disease, or heart disease Therefore, the probability of receiving a health
shock, d t , in each period is set to 40 percent when agents are in the third stage and 0 percent
otherwise and the value of out-of-pocket medical bills, t , is set to 0.75. A sensitivity analysis
in section 7 explores what happens to the model with higher and lower values t .
The housing grid is based on the square footage for homeowners and renters from the US
Census Bureau, American Housing Survey 2017. Renters can choose between two house sizes:

hrent = {1.00,1.25} (a value of 1.00 can be interpreted as 1,000 square feet). Owners can choose
between four house sizes: hown = {1.75, 2.25,3.00,3.50} . The average house size is set to 2.25.
The state variables in the dynamic programing problem consist of life stages st , net
assets (savings and mortgage) at , housing ht , and employment state et . There are 3 grid points
for life stages, 76 grid points for assets (-9.9 to 3.6), 6 grid points for housing (1 to 3.50), and 4
values for idiosyncratic income. This results in 5,472 possible state combinations in the model.
7.

Results
In this section, I use the benchmark model to investigate whether Americans age 55 and

older are using their house as a form of precautionary savings by simulating the housing choices
made by this demographic. First, I simulate the benchmark model where individuals are aware
that their health could change in the future, and they will be forced to pay out-of-pocket medical
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bills. I then simulate a model eliminating the health shock to determine how this population
makes housing decisions in its absence.
To solve for the steady state decision rules in the economy, I begin by guessing the house
price and solving the decision rules using value function iteration. After each iteration, I
compare aggregate housing demand to aggregate housing supply. The house price is updated,
and this process is repeated until aggregate housing demand is equal to aggregate housing
supply. Using these decision rules, I simulate an economy with 10,000 individuals for 3,750
periods and generate aggregate statistics for the economy. I discard the first 750 periods to avoid
any issues with initial conditions.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
To assess the validity of the model, I compare homeownership rates in the benchmark
model with a health shock to those in the HRS. Table 2 shows the results of the model compared
to the HRS. The model generates an average homeownership rate of 78.1 percent compared with
77.8 percent in the HRS. The model also does a reasonable job of approximating
homeownership rates for each stage of life which was the main target to match in the calibration.
Table 4 also shows the percent of agents who moved compared to the data. Moving rates are
close but slightly lower than what is seen in the data. The baseline model generates average
moving rate of 9.1 percent compared to 10.7 percent seen in the HRS.
A. Economies with and without a Potential Health Shock
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 3 presents the results from the simulation of the benchmark economy and a
counterfactual economy where agents are not subject to out-of-pocket medical expenses. If
agents know that they will not receive a health shock, average homeownership rates are 70.7
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percent (compared to 78.1 percent when a health-shock is possible). The counterfactual model
shows almost a 6-percentage point decrease in the number of households that own a home in
their late working years (stage 1) compared to the benchmark model. When households retire
(stage 2), the percent of households who own is almost 4-percentage points lower and the rate of
moving is 1-percentage point higher in the counterfactual model. In addition, there is a 1percentage point increase in the percent of homeowners who move and downsize. In late
retirement (stage 3), homeownership rates are 13-percentage points lower when there is no health
shock and moving rates are 1.2-percentage points higher. There is also a 1.8-percentage point
increase in the rate of homeowners who move to renting. In both retirement stages, households
are more likely to move from owning to renting and more likely to downsize when moving in the
counterfactual model compared to the benchmark model.
Since fewer households choose to own a home and those that move are more likely to
either downsize or rent when an increase households know they will not face an increase in outof-pocket medical expenses, this suggests that more older households would prefer to use their
housing equity to help finance consumption but fear they might need to sell it if they get sick in
the future. This provides evidence that households are engaging in precautionary savings using
the home.
B. Insurance Policy
The fact that households are more likely to behave in accordance with the LCH when
they know there is no possibility of future out-of-pocket medical expenses suggests that the
existing health insurance market for seniors is incomplete. As an experiment, I will incorporate
an insurance policy, that goes beyond what is currently covered by Medicare and supplemental
coverage, to determine its impact on homeownership decisions of older Americans.

60

Individuals can choose to purchase insurance that would cover all out-of-pocket medical
expenses. The cost of insurance is  , a fraction of individual income. Here, if an individual
chooses to purchase such a policy, then  t = 1 ; and if they choose not to purchase the policy,

 t = 0 . With this insurance policy, I t , available, the budget constraint faced by agents in the
model becomes:
ct + ht +1 − at +1 = yts − dt t t −  t It + ht + (1 + r )at − Tt i − Tt p − Ft

(19)

where,
 yts if  t = 1
It = 
 0 if  t = 0

(20)

An agent who purchases insurance might still get sick, however they will not be forced to pay
medical bills out of their income, savings, or by selling their house. It will be covered by the
insurance policy. So, the health shock t becomes:
 if  t =0
t t =  t
 0 if  t =1

(21)

[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The goal of this experiment was to determine what the price of insurance would so the output of
the benchmark economy with insurance matched the output of the counterfactual economy. If

 = 0.04 , 12.8 percent of households purchase the insurance. With the insurance policy
available, homeownership and moving rates become very similar to the counterfactual model
where there are no health shocks. Table 4 compares the output of the benchmark model with
insurance where  = 0.04 to the output of the counterfactual model. This provides evidence that
with the proper insurance coverage in their later years, Americans age 55 and older would be
more willing to use the equity in their homes which is demonstrated by an increased likelihood
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of moving from owning to renting and downsizing. Thus, more individuals act in a manner that
would be expected by the LCH if they knew all future medical expenses would be covered.
8. Sensitivity Analysis
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
This section provides a sensitivity analysis to the results of the calibration, which are
shown in Table 5. First, I evaluate the impact of higher and lower values of possible out-ofpocket medical expenses, t . Lowering t to 0.25 from 0.75 results in a decrease in the rate of
homeownership to 71.6 percent compared with 78.1 percent in the benchmark model. Also, this
results in an increase in the rate of moving to 10.2 percent from 9.1 percent. Increasing t to
1.25 yields the opposite effect. The rate of homeownership increases to 95.3 percent and the rate
of moving decreases to 7.6 percent. This provides further evidence that Americans aged 55 and
older are engaging in precautionary savings where they would sell their house to pay for possible
future medical bills. The higher the cost of medical bills from a potential health shock, t , an
increasing number of households stay in their home late into retirement and a decreasing number
move. The higher the potential medical bills, the more likely households are to stay in their
home in case they need to sell it to offset these costs.
Additionally, I evaluate the impact of transaction costs on the model by comparing a
model without transaction costs to the benchmark model. When households do not have to pay
transaction costs, it has a minimal impact on the distribution of homeownership rates in each
stage, however, there is an increase in the rate of moving in each stage. While this is not
something I set out to investigate in this paper, several studies have proposed this as one possible
explanation for why older households do not use their housing equity (Venti and Wise 1990; Ai
et al. 1990; Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Feinstein and McFadden 1989).
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Since the rate at which current homeowners move increases compared to the benchmark
economy, this may provide some evidence that high transaction costs are keeping some
Americans age 55 and older in their home when they otherwise might move .
9. Conclusions
In this paper, using an economy populated with overlapping generations of heterogeneous
agents, I examine how homeowners are engaging in precautionary savings using their house to
pay for potential future medical bills, rather than using its equity toward consumption in
retirement. It appears that due to gaps in health insurance that exist for retirees, a significant
number of Americans appear to own a house well into retirement to offset the costs of possible
future out-of-pocket medical bills. In a counterfactual economy where individual’s do not face
out-of-pocket medical expenses, there is a 13-percentage point decrease in the number of
homeowners compared to the benchmark model where potential health shocks are a factor.
Additionally, there is an increase in the percent of homeowners who move from owning to
renting and downsize. These are ways in which households can extract equity from their house.
Evidence that homeowners engaging in precautionary savings using their house is further
reinforced as the more money that households might have to spend for potential increases in
medical bills leads to an increase in the number of Americans age 55 and older who own homes.
Using this framework, I explore what would happen if seniors had access to health
insurance that covered all their out-of-pocket medical expenses in their late retirement years, so
individuals do not need to engage in precautionary savings. I show that if the cost of such a
policy is four percent of household income, then 12.8 percent of households will purchase it.
Agents may still receive a health shock, but they will not be forced to pay for it from their
income, savings, or selling their house. The two model economies in this study – the one where
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agents face a potential health shock and the one where they do not – exhibit similar rates of
homeownership and moving when the insurance policy is available. This shows that with more
adequate health insurance coverage for seniors, households will be more likely to use the equity
in their house to increase consumption in retirement which is what would be expected per the
Life Cycle Hypothesis.
There are other important and interesting questions related to housing equity and
precautionary savings that I did not explore in this paper. Future research should seek to
investigate the impact of local and state policies on how Americans age 55 and older make
housing decisions. Also, the impact of changes to reverse mortgages and changes to the way
they are administered could allow homeowners to use the equity in their home without moving to
cover out-of-pocket medical expenses is left to future research. Finally, extending this model to
include altruism and bequeathing the house would provide additional insights as to why older
Americans are not using their housing equity to increase consumption in retirement.
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11. Tables
Table 1. Summary of Model Parameters
Parameter
p
rd
rm











0

1

2

ws

t
dt

Description
Property Tax Rate
Interest Rate for Deposits
Interest Rate for Mortgages
Transaction Cost of Selling a Home
Maximum Loan-to-Value
Income Tax Parameter

Value
1.0%
1.7%
4.05%
10.0%
80%
0.258

Source
Walczak (2015)
Imrohoroglu et al. (2018)
Freddie Mac (2018)
Calibrated
Imrohoroglu et al. (2018)
Gouveia and Strauss (1994)

Income Tax Parameter

0.768

Gouveia and Strauss (1994)

Income Tax Parameter

0.50

Calibrated

Relative Weight of c in Utility
Relative Risk Aversion
Housing Depreciation Rate
Time Discount Factor
Wage Profile
Health Shock to Income
Probability of Health Shock

0.66
5.0, 8.0, 10.0
1.7%
0.96
2.5, 2.2, 1.7
0.75
0.40

Bureau of Labor Statistics (2016)
Calibrated – Albert and Duffy (2012), Tymula et al. (2013)
De Nardi (2004), Imrohoroglu et al. (2018)
Common in literature
Calibrated
Calibrated
Health and Retirement Study

Notes: the values of calibrated parameters are set so the output of model fits the data in the HRS
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Table 2. Model Fit vs HRS Data
Percent
Own a House
Model
HRS Data
Move
Model
HRS Data

First Stage

Second Stage

Third Stage

76.0
76.0

81.3
80.4

72.8
78.9

11.2
11.9

7.4
9.9

7.2
9.0

Table 3. Results of Economy with Health Shock vs No Health Shock

Percent
Own
Move
Stage 1
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Move
Stage 2
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Move
Stage 3
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Overall
Move

Economy
Health Shock No Health Shock
79.2
73.3
11.2
12.1
1.6
2.2
3.5
3.7
81.3
77.5
7.4
8.3
1.0
1.0
2.8
3.8
72.8
59.7
7.2
8.4
1.8
3.6
3.1
3.3
78.1
70.7
9.1
10.1
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Table 4. Homeownership and Moving Rates with the Insurance Policy
Percent

Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Total

Own
Move
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Move
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Move
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Move
Percent Bought Insurance

No Health
Shock
73.3
12.1
2.2
3.7
77.5
8.3
1.0
3.8
59.7
8.4
3.6
3.3
70.7
10.1
0.0

Health Shock with
Insurance
72.7
12.1
2.2
3.7
76.8
8.4
1.0
3.8
59.6
9.1
3.5
3.2
70.2
10.3
12.8

Notes: Price of insurance policy is 4.0% of household income

Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis
Benchmark
Percent
Own
Move
Stage 1
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Move
Stage 2
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Move
Stage 3
Move Own to Rent
Move and Downsize
Own
Overall
Move

79.2
11.2
1.6
3.5
81.3
7.4
1.0
2.8
72.8
7.2
1.8
3.1
78.1
9.1

Low

t

High

73.9
12.2
2.2
3.7
77.6
8.2
0.9
3.6
61.8
8.8
3.2
3.0
71.6
10.2

Notes: t = 0.75 in the benchmark economy, 0.25 for low t , and 1.25 for high

t

94.7
9.6
0.7
3.2
95.5
6.8
0.3
3.4
96.0
5.3
0.1
3.9
95.3
7.6

No
Transaction
Costs
79.6
14.4
1.6
6.7
82.0
11.1
0.7
6.3
73.0
11.0
1.9
6.3
78.4
12.6

t
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Chapter 3
Home Maintenance and Housing Disinvestment among Older Americans
Abstract: Understanding why Americans do not use their housing equity in retirement has been
the focus of extensive research. There has been some evidence to suggest that homes owned by
older Americas appreciate at a slower rate than younger households and that this might be due in
part to a decrease in spending on maintenance. Using the Health and Retirement Study, this paper
builds on previous research by showing that the time older homeowners spend performing
maintenance themselves is important to consider alongside spending when looking at how much
older homeowners are reducing their investment in maintenance. Households disinvest as much
as $43,000 between the ages of 65-84 by decreasing time and spending on maintenance, which
amounts to around $2,150 annually that could be used to increase consumption spending in
retirement. Failing to account for the value of time spent on home maintenance would lead to a
30 percent understatement of the true value of disinvestment. While this is a significant amount
of money disinvested from the home, questions arise as to why other alternatives, such as a reverse
mortgage, that yield even more money towards potential retirement use, are not pursued more
often.
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1. Introduction
It is well established that Americans 65 and older tend to hold on to large amounts of
housing equity throughout their retirement. According to the US Census Bureau (2018),
approximately 80 percent of Americans age 65 and older owned a home, Li and Goodman
(2016) found the average net worth of houses owned by retirees to be around $200,000 in 2015.
This accounts for nearly half the net worth of retired Americans (Moulton et al. 2016). The LifeCycle Hypothesis (LCH) suggests that households are net savers during their working years and
draw down those savings in retirement to smooth consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954).
Thus, households should draw down their housing equity in retirement. However, this is not
often the case, as many households do not decrease housing equity except in the case of divorce
or death of a spouse. (Borsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, and Kotlikoff 1992; Ai et al. 1990; Feinstein
and McFadden 1989; Fisher et al. 2007; Poterba, Venti, and Wise 2011; Venti and Wise 1989,
1990, 2001, 2004). Thus, many individuals die retaining large amounts of housing equity.
Retired homeowners could extract housing equity by moving and downsizing or renting;
however, most retirees prefer to stay in their current home throughout retirement (Venti and
Wise 2004; American Association of Retired Persons 1996; Munnell, Soto, and Aubry 2007).
This is reflected in exceptionally low moving rates for retirees ranging from 1.7 to 9.1 percent
per year, half of which is households upsizing (Venti and Wise 1989, 1990, 2001, 2004;
Feinstein and McFadden 1989; Murray 2019). Since most households want to remain in their
home, they could gradually extract housing equity through financial instruments like a reverse
mortgage. However, there is little evidence to suggest this is a popular mechanism for most
households (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017; Kaul and Goodman 2017; Davidoff, Gerhard, and
Post 2017).
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This paper examines the possibility that households do extract housing equity while
remaining in their home by the reallocation of time and resources to housing maintenance. If left
alone, a house will depreciate as foundations crack, roofs leak, paint peals, pipes burst, and
durable goods become obsolete. It is possible that households extract equity from their homes by
changing how much they invest in the upkeep of their house. This was first proposed by
Feinstein and McFadden (1989). Older households tend to spend around $900-$1400 per year
less than the average household on home maintenance (Begley and Lambie-Hanson 2015;
Davidoff 2006; Gyourko and Tracy 2006; Haughwout, Sutherland, and Tracy 2013; Fisher and
Williams 2011). As a result, households age 75 and older see their homes appreciate 1.0-3.6
percent slower relative to working and middle-aged households (Davidoff 2006; Rodda and
Patrabansh 2007).
Nevertheless, using total expenditure on housing maintenance may be a poor measure of
actual investment in the home. Becker (1964) shows that older adults substitute goods-intensive
food production with time-intensive production. This could be the case with housing
maintenance as well. Failing to account for the how older adults use time in retirement provides
an incomplete picture of their housing investment decisions. Aguiar and Hurst (2005) show that
a decrease in food expenditure is offset by an increase in home production of food. Therefore, it
is possible that a decrease in maintenance expenditure in retirement may be offset by more time
being spent maintaining and improving the home. If this is the case, then housing wealth is not
being extracted due to lack of maintenance; and the slower rate of home appreciation is a product
of other observed and unobserved differences between older and younger homeowners.
However, if older households are allotting less time to housing maintenance while
simultaneously reducing their expenditure, then the previous studies underreport the true value of
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home disinvestment. Thus, depending on the valuation of time devoted to maintaining one’s
own home, forgoing home maintenance might provide an even better explanation as to how
some households that opt to remain in place may act more in accordance with the LCH than
previously thought.
In a preview of the results, we see that homes owned by those 75 and older appreciate
1.5-1.9 percent less annually than younger households, which is consistent with the findings of
Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) and Davidoff (2006). This study also finds a spike in time spent
on home maintenance around age 65 as individuals are retiring, but there is a steady decline after
that with households aged 75 and older spending 18.0-28.3 fewer hours per year on home
maintenance than younger households. When including time spent on home maintenance,
households aged 75 and older spend $1,388-$1,999 less per year than younger households ages
50 to 74. Failing to account for time spent on home maintenance leads to a 30-52 percent
understatement of the true dollar value of the decline in maintenance spending. On average,
households disinvest almost $43,000 – or around $2,150 annually – between ages 65-84. This is
30 percent higher than the corresponding value with use of time excluded. It is clear that older
households are extracting housing equity by forgoing investment in home maintenance.
However, it is not clear if this is the optimal way to do so as other options (e.g., moving and
annuitizing the proceeds, reverse mortgages, etc.) seem to yield higher annual payouts (Shan
2011; Butrica and Mudrazija 2016).
This paper contributes to the literature by combining the research on the use of housing
equity by older Americans (see Feinstein and McFadden (1989); Fisher et al. (2007); Hurd
(1992); Murray (2018, 2019); Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011); Venti and Wise (1989, 1990,
2001, 2004) and others) with the research on housing maintenance by the likes of Bogdon
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(1996); Davidoff (2006); Fisher and Williams (2011); Gyourko and Tracy (2006); Rodda and
Patrabansh (2007) and others. The results of this paper suggest that older households may be
acting more in accordance with the LCH that previously expected as they are extracting housing
equity by forgoing investment in home maintenance. While Aguiar and Hurst (2005) find that a
decrease expenditure on the consumption of food is offset by an increase in the home production
of food, this results show in this paper find the opposite. Households are not increasing time
spent on home maintenance and households are forgoing more maintenance than previous
studies suggest by showing that time spent and expenditure on home maintenance declines as
individuals age. This decline in total investment also corresponds to slower appreciation rates
for older homeowners, possibly providing evidence this is a way in which these households are
extracting housing equity.
2. Data
To fully investigate household expenditures on home maintenance, it is necessary to
consider both money and time allocated to home improvement. Failure to account for time
invested by homeowners potentially ignores an important source of wealth management. As
noted in Dunn (2015), there are few data sources that include both expenditure and time use for
all members of a household. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a notable example
along with its supplement, the Consumption and Activities Mail Survey (CAMS), which is
administered to a sub-sample of HRS participants.
The HRS is a longitudinal survey that includes about 20,000 households over age 50,
representative of the overall United States population in that age group. The HRS defines an
observational unit as an eligible household containing at least one person born within a given
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time period (which varies by phase)1. The HRS is administered by the University of Michigan
Institute for Social Research in partnership with the RAND Center for the Study of Aging. The
original target population for the HRS when the study was initiated in 1992 is adults born
between 1931-1941 (designated ‘HRS Cohort’) and those born before 1924 (AHEAD cohort).
Every six years the survey adds a new cohort starting in 1998 with those born between1 9241930 (Children of the Depression) and 1942-1947 (War Babies Cohort). In 2004 those born
between 1948-1953 (Early Baby Boomers Cohort) were added; and the last group added was in
2010 with the addition of those born between 1954-1959 (Mid-Baby Boomers Cohort).
The American Housing Survey is also used for examining home maintenance, however,
the HRS is unique in its specific focus on Americans aged 50 and older. The HRS and CAMS
consider the use of time as well as health when investigating how older Americans choose to
maintain their home. Using the restricted version of the HRS provides an opportunity to verify
the results of other studies using a different sample, as well as add new information other surveys
cannot provide.
The sample for this study is restricted to households that continuously reside in a singlefamily residence that they own, where the wife is over age 50 in married households and the
owner is over age 50 in single households2.

This restriction limits households that move at any

point during the sample period or do not own their house. To ensure that the housing investment
decision is not being driven by other factors, the sample is limited to either always single or
always married couples. Finally, households that include additional members (e.g., parents,

1

For more information on the HRS and its sample selection, see https://hrs.isr.umich.edu/publications/biblio/9047
(HRS Staff 2008).
2
Men tend to be older than their wives, so using the husband’s age in a graphical analysis would shift the profile
rightward.
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children, etc.) are excluded so the only individuals who derive utility from the home are the
owners.
CAMS respondents are asked to report annual household expenditure (for both the
respondent and the spouse in married households) on materials purchased for home repair and
expenditure on professional services for maintenance and repair. In addition, CAMS
respondents provide the number of monthly hours doing home improvements or home repair.
Summing the value of time spent on home maintenance with total household expenditure on
maintenance allows for a complete analysis of the investment decisions of households regarding
changes in maintenance and upkeep of the home.
The HRS core survey includes individual and household information on home ownership,
house values3, money spent on major repairs, income, wealth, health (e.g., cognition and
mobility), and other household demographic variables that are used in this analysis. All monetary
values in the HRS and CAMS are reported in nominal dollars and have been converted into 2009
real dollars using the PCE chain-type price index taken from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database4. Some of the HRS and CAMS variables are reported in different time frames (e.g.,
monthly, yearly, biyearly, etc.) and have been converted to annual values. Descriptive statistics
of all the variables used in this analysis can be found in Table 1, and a detailed breakdown of all
the variables used in this analysis can be found in Appendix A.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

3

House values in the HRS are subject to input and misreporting errors that can cause large percentage changes
between years. To properly analyze house values, changes were made to some of the values. A detailed breakdown
of how this was done can be found in Appendix A.
4
Downloaded from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PCEPI) on 5/13/2017
(US Bureau of Economic Analysis).
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3. Empirical Strategy
This study looks at the impact of changes in spending on maintenance, time spent on
maintenance, and house value as households age. For the purposes of this study, old age is
defined as a household over age 75. Venti and Wise (2001) show this is the age when housing
equity starts to decline, which is consistent with previous studies investigating this issue
(Davidoff 2006; Rodda and Patrabansh 2007).
The first set of regressions estimate the effect of old age on home improvement spending.
The regressions take the following form:

SPENDINGit = 0 + 1 AGE 75it +  ' X it + i + t +  it

(1)

Three measures of spending are used for the dependent variable: (i) spending on maintenance5,
(ii) spending on major home improvements, and (iii) total household spending. X it consists of a
series of demographic controls that include: house value, household income, non-housing wealth,
an indicator for marital status, an indicator for good mobility, and an indicator for urban status.

i is state fixed effects and t is year fixed effects. An additional set of regressions is also
estimated and is identical to equation (1), however, dividing the spending metrics by house
value.
The second set of regressions estimate household time spent on home maintenance as
well as total expenditures to that end, including the dollar value of time. They take the same
form as equation (1), but replace SPENDINGit with (i) total household time spent on home
maintenance and (ii) total investment in home maintenance including the value of time use.

5

Spending on maintenance consists of expenditure on professional services as well as do-it-yourself materials.
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Davidoff (2006) notes the empirical challenges of examining home maintenance by older
Americans. He notes that maintenance may not directly add quality to the home because
“painting a room…may add nothing to the resale value of one’s home, but fixing a leaky pipe
almost certainly enhances resale value.” This makes it difficult to assess whether spending on
maintenance directly impacts quality of housing. He suggests a better approach is to determine if
older households see their houses appreciate more slowly relative to younger households, an
approach also adopted by Rodda and Patrabansh (2007). This paper takes a similar approach for
the final set of regressions which estimate annual appreciation of house value. These regressions
take the following form:

APPRECIATIONit = 0 + 1 AGE75it +  ' X it + i + t +  it

(2)

There are two measures used to determine appreciation for the dependent variable: (i) log
differences and (ii) compounds annual growth rate (CAGR). Both Davidoff (2006) and Rodda
and Patrabansh (2007) use log differences, defined as:
 Future House Value 
Log Differences = log 

 Present House Value 

(3)

Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) also include an additional measure of CAGR which is defined as:
1

 Future House Value  n
CAGR = 
 −1
 Present House Value 

(4)

Since the HRS is administered biannually, n = 2 for this calculation. X it includes a series of
demographic controls that include indicators for race, marital status, urban status, and good
cognition. Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) suggest that one possible explanation for older
households reporting lower appreciation rates could be a lack of awareness of the market and

79

being removed from the buying and selling process. The HRS includes a variable for total
cognitive score, which is included in the controls for this purpose.
4. Age Profile of Household Investment in Maintenance
A. Annual Household Spending on Home Maintenance
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 plots the mean household expenditure on maintenance and major home
improvements. Maintenance cost is defined as spending on both professional services and do-ityourself materials. This figure tends to fluctuate around a mean value of $3,000 per year
between ages 50 and 65. Spending on major home improvements fluctuates between a mean
value of $2,000-$3,000 per year between ages 50 and 60, with a spike to around $3,500 per year
around age 65 as households retire. Following age 65, there is a clear downward trend in both
types of home repair and total spending on home investment. It appears that households increase
spending on the house just as they are about to retire then slowly decrease spending each year
after.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Table 2 shows that mean total household expenditure falls from $4,976 between ages 5064 to $3,894 between ages 65-74, a 21.7 percent decline. This decline is even greater between
the 65-74 and 75-84 age bracket, falling 28.7 percent to $2,778 per year, and is particularly sharp
after age 74. It appears households make initial major improvements and renovations right
around retirement age in preparation for spending retirement in their home. Spending on do-ityourself materials falling with age is consistent with the findings of Bogdon (1996) and Davidoff
(2006) and coincides with a decline in time spent on home maintenance with age which is shown
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in the next section. Table 3 shows total household expenditure and time invested in maintenance
by marital status. Married households spend on average $1,640 more per year on maintenance
than single households do between the ages of 50-84.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 4 presents the regression estimates for spending on maintenance. Households aged
75 and older spend between $500-$849 less per year on maintenance6 and $494-$949 less on
major improvements than younger households. This amounts to $908-$1,534 less in total
spending on home maintenance per year. These estimates are in line with Davidoff (2006) who
finds households aged 75 and older spend between $644-$1,228 less per year than younger
households using the American Housing Survey, which asks similar questions to the HRS on
spending on maintenance, do-it-yourself materials, and major improvements.
B. Annual Household Time Spent on Home Maintenance
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2 plots the mean time spent on home maintenance activities for men and women.
Between ages 50 and 62, time men dedicate to home maintenance tends to fluctuate between 6080 hours per year. This number spikes to between 80-100 hours starting at age 60, as households
appear to start preparing the home for retirement in their last prime working years. Following
age 66, there is a steady decline each year. Women tend to allocate around 35-40 percent as
much time as men do on home maintenance. Between ages 50-70, women spend on average
between 20-40 hours per year with a steady decline after that.
Table 2 shows that the average hours spent on home maintenance by a household
declines from 80 per year between ages 50-64 to 61 per year between ages 65-75, a 24.2 percent

6

Maintenance is defined as spending on both professional services and do-it-yourself materials.
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decline. This decline accelerates between ages 65-74 and 75-84 as annual hours fall 38.5 percent
to 37 hours. Home maintenance hours spent by women do not decline starting at age 66 as seen
with men but have a more consistent profile until after age 74, when women’s hours start to
decline. Table 3 shows that married men invest on average 17.8 hours more per year than nonmarried men on home maintenance though the decline in hours spent is quicker for married men
as they age compared to single men. Married women and single women invest the same number
of hours on maintaining the home. Overall, Figure 2 and Tables 2 and 3 show a spike in time
spent on home maintenance right around retirement age followed by a steady decline.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Table 5 shows the regression estimates of old age on time spent on home maintenance.
Households aged 75 and older spend 18.0-28.3 hours less per year on home maintenance than
younger households do. The reduction of hours for men after age 75 is slightly more than it is
for women. Men aged 75 and older spend 15.6-25.3 less hours per year than younger men and
women aged 75 and older spend 14.3-17.7 less hours per year than younger women on home
maintenance.
C. Valuating Time Spent on Home Maintenance
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
The average national cost of a handyman is around $77 per hour7. Bridgman (2013)
estimates that an hour or work at home adds around half the value of work in the market to GDP.
Since home maintenance can be physically taxing and to be conservative, it is assumed that
individuals are around one-third as productive as skilled labor regardless of gender or age. The
value of homeowner maintenance is assumed to be $25 per hour. Figure 3 plots the total dollar

7

According to Home Advisor’s True Cost Guide, https://www.homeadvisor.com/cost/handyman/#closing-article,
visited on 2/24/19.
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investment by age when factoring in time spent on home maintenance at $25 per hour. This
figure shows the same trends as with time and money spent on home maintenance. Total
investment in home maintenance fluctuates between $5,000-$6,000 per year until ages 60-66
where it spikes to between $6,000-$7,000 per year, with a noticeable decline following age 66.
Failing to account for the value of time spent on the home causes the value of home investment
to be understated by $1,000-$1,500 per year.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
Since it is possible that house value may play a role into how much time and money is
spent on maintenance, Figure 4 plots total spending and total investment including time divided
by house value. Households tend to spend 2.5-3.5 percent of their house value on home
maintenance prior to retirement age with a spike around age 65, consistent with the previous
metrics.

Following age 65 there is a decline with households aged 75 and older spending 1.0-

2.5 percent of their house value on home maintenance. Table 6 shows the regression estimates
of spending divided by house value. Households aged 75 and older spend 0.4-0.5 percent of
their house value less on maintenance per year than younger households.
D. Total Value of Disinvestment
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
Table 7 shows mean investment in maintenance by homeowners in their late working
years as well as their total cumulative spending through age 89. Households spend $6,144 per
year between ages 50-64 on total home maintenance and repair when including time spent valued
at $25 per hour, and spending declines each year after. This is reflected visually in Figure 5.
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Table 6 and Figure 5 show what the total level of investment would be if households maintained
the same level of spending as they did between ages 50-64, compared to what they actually
spend. On average, homeowners invest a total of $79,952 in home maintenance and repair
between the ages of 65-84. This is $42,944 less than they would have spent by maintaining the
same level of investment they did between ages 50-64, an average of $2,147 per year. For
households aged 75 and older, the mean house value is $200,442. Thus, the mean level of
disinvestment in maintenance is 19.5 percent of house value. If the value of time spent on home
maintenance were not included, the total disinvestment between ages 65-84 would be $33,207, or
$1,660 per year. Failing to consider the value of time use leads to a 30 percent understatement of
the true value of disinvestment in home maintenance.
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE]
To examine how this level of disinvestment changes with age, Table 8 shows the
regression results of old age on total home investment and total home investment as a percent of
house value. Homeowners aged 75 and older spend between $1,388-$1,999 less per year on total
home investment than younger households do. If the value of time was not included, the yearly
figure would be $465-$478 less than this. Excluding the value of time spent on home
maintenance causes the true value of disinvestment by older homeowners to be understated by
30-52 percent.8 When considering the percent of house value invested on home maintenance,
older households spend 0.7-0.8 percent less of their house value per year on home maintenance
than younger households. Failure to account for the value of time spent on the home leads to a
0.3 percentage point understatement.

8

Comparing the results from columns 1 and 2 from Table 6 to columns 5 and 6 from Table 2
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5. Appreciation of House Values for Older Americans
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE]
With a clear decline in investment in maintenance as homeowners age, it is important to
determine if there is also a corresponding change to the value of their house. This is done by
comparing the log difference of annual house value and the compound annual growth rate
(CAGR)9, the results are shown in Table 9. Log differences show that houses owned by people
aged 75 and older appreciate between 1.5-1.9 percent less per year those of younger
homeowners. These figures are relatively consistent with the 1.8-2.5 percent that Davidoff
(2006) finds using the American Housing Survey. The appreciation rate according to CAGR is
between 0.4-0.5 percent less per year than younger homeowners. The CAGR estimates are not
statistically distinguishable from zero, but are somewhat comparable in magnitude to a similar
specification by Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) who find CAGR for houses owned by people aged
75 and older to appreciate 0.23 percent less than those owned by younger people in their study
that also uses the HRS. The difference is most likely due to a slightly different sample selection
as well as using data from different waves of the HRS.
As mentioned earlier, Davidoff (2006) notes that spending on maintenance may not
directly impact house value, making it difficult to assess the direct impact of a dollar spent on
maintenance to changes in house value. However, the mean appreciation using log differences is
-2.15 percent between ages 50-74 and -6.15 percent for ages 75 and over. Homeowners spend
on average 3.10 percent of their house value on maintenance between ages 50-74 and 2.23
percent from ages 75 and older, indicating that disinvestment from lack of maintenance sums to
less than the fall in house values. While homeowners are forgoing significant investment on

9

Equations 3 and 4 in Section 3 define these metrics

85

maintenance, the amount of disinvestment in maintenance is smaller than the decline in house
values, similar to the findings of Davidoff (2006).
6. Discussion and Conclusions
Older households appear to want to remain in their house rather than extract housing
equity via moving or reverse mortgages, which could lead to higher levels of consumption in
retirement. Davidoff (2006) and Fisher and Williams (2011) show that households forgo
investment in maintenance as they age, however do not account for time spend by the owners on
home maintenance. Davidoff (2006) and Rodda and Patrabansh (2007) show that homes of
those over age 75 appreciate at a slower rate compared to those of younger homeowners. This
paper builds on the prior research by pointing to the necessity of including the value of time
when assessing home maintenance and repair expenditure and that unlike in Aguiar and Hurst
(2005), time spent on home maintenance does not offset the decline in maintenance expenditure.
Homeowners tend to increase the amount of money and time they invest into home maintenance
and repair around age 65 for what appears to be preparation for living there during retirement.
Following age 65, there is a steady decline in the amount of time and money that gets invested
into the home. Households will disinvest an average of $42,944 by forgoing investment in home
maintenance between the ages of 65-84, amounting to $2,147 per year. To accompany this
disinvestment, this study shows that households owned by those aged 75 and older are
appreciating 1.5-1.9 percent less per year than those owned by younger Americans, suggesting
that the lack of maintenance is leading to an equity extraction from the home.
While homeowners are disinvesting a considerable amount from their home in retirement,
this may not be the most optimal way to extract equity. Butrica and Mudrazija (2016) show that
older households could increase their median income by as much as 40 percent by selling their
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home and annuitizing the money from the sale. However, since households seem unwilling to
relocate, is disinvesting in home maintenance a better source of income than a reverse mortgage?
Home Equity Conversion Mortgage’s (HECMs) account for 90 percent of reverse mortgages in
the United States (Nakajima and Telyukova 2017). One of the more popular ways households
extract equity through a HECM is through the Tenure plan. The Tenure plan allows the
homeowner to receive equal monthly payments the remainder of time in their home (Johnson and
Simkins 2014; Shan 2011). This HECM plan is comparable in terms of equity extraction by
forgoing maintenance for a household that spends the majority of their retirement in the same
house. Shan (2011) shows that for a $200,000 house (close to the average house value of the
HRS sample used for this study), the annual payout for a Tenure plan is between $5,232-$7,32010
per year for a household that takes out a HECM at age 6511.
Given that older homeowners want to stay in their home and the amount of money
available via a reverse mortgage is more than double what the average household is extracting by
forgoing maintenance, new questions arise as to the reasons why older homeowners are not using
reverse mortgages, a sentiment also noted by Davidoff (2006). One possible explanation is that
older homeowners do not have the financial literacy to fully comprehend reverse mortgages and
generally lack awareness of them (Venti and Wise 1990, 2004; Kutty 1998; Davidoff, Gerhard,
and Post 2017; Kaul and Goodman 2017). However, one of the primary reasons reverse
mortgages are not popular is because homeowners say the costs are too high (Moulton et al.
2016; Redfoot, Scholen, and Brown 2007). The Moulton study further reports small payouts and
a desire to be debt-free as other reasons homeowners give for forgoing this option. These
explanations are puzzling because by staying in their home and deferring maintenance they will

10
11

This value varies depending on interest rates
Table 1 in Shan (2011) lays out the proceeds of a hypothetical borrower of a house worth $200,000
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be extracting a smaller amount of money from their home. This gives more plausibility to a lack
of understanding of what a reverse mortgage is and how it works. Kaul and Goodman (2017)
outline some possible changes that would increase the popularity and effectiveness of reverse
mortgages; however, even in their current state they appear to be a better method of equity
extraction than forgoing maintenance.
Despite more lucrative options available, households are extracting home equity by
forgoing investment in home repair (in both money and time). Whether or not this is intentional
is not clear at this point and worth exploring in the future. This study shows that the value of
disinvestment due to decreases in maintenance is higher than previously thought and is an
important consideration for future studies of this nature. This study shows that spending on
home maintenance is not offset by an increase in time spent on home maintenance and that
households are indeed forgoing maintenance as they age which appears to lead to slower
appreciation rates for older homeowners. This provides some evidence to suggest that older
homeowners are extracting some equity from their home by forgoing maintenance.
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8. Tables and Figures
Figure 1. Annual Household Spending on Home Maintenance
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Notes: Maintenance is spending on professional services plus spending on do-it-yourself materials. Total Spending equals spending on maintenance and major
home improvements. The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1. Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the
weighted mean for the observations at ages 59, 60, and 61
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Figure 2. Annual Time Spent on Home Maintenance by Males and Females
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Notes: The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1. Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the weighted mean for
the observations at ages 59, 60, and 61
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Figure 3. Total Investment into Home Maintenance including Time Valued at $25/hour
9000

8000

7000

Annual Dollars

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

Age

Notes: Total household investment includes maintenance spending (spending on professional services plus spending on do-it-yourself material), home
improvement spending, and total household time invested valued at $25 per hour. The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a
bandwidth of λ=1. Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the weighted mean for the observations at ages 59, 60, and 61
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Figure 4. Annual Percent of House Value Spent on Maintenance
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Notes: The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1. Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the weighted mean for
the observations at ages 59, 60, and 61
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Figure 5. Total Cumulative Expenditure on Home Maintenance
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Notes: Total cumulative spending assumes that the household invests the same amount each year into home maintenance as they did during their late working
years (age 50-64). Total cumulative expenditure comes from Table 6 and is the sum of actual expenditure spent as the household ages.
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Figure 6. Annual Appreciation of House Values
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CAGR = compound annual growth rate = (Future Value / Present Value) 1/n – 1. N is the number of years and is equal to 2 since the HRS is a biannual survey.
The line is a local mean smoother that uses the Epanecknikov kernel with a bandwidth of λ=1. Thus, the local mean for age 60 is the weighted mean for the
observations at ages 59, 60, and 61.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Age
75+

50-74

Demographics
Age
Male
Female
Married
Urban Household
White
Black
Good Mobility
Good Cognition

All

Mean

Std Dev

Mean

Std
Dev

Mean

Std Dev

66.38
0.49
0.51
0.69
0.77
0.82
0.15
0.77
0.91

5.41
0.50
0.50
0.46
0.42
0.39
0.35
0.77
0.29

80.37
0.31
0.69
0.42
0.77
0.85
0.12
0.68
0.79

4.61
0.46
0.46
0.49
0.42
0.36
0.33
0.47
0.41

70.98
0.44
0.56
0.60
0.77
0.83
0.14
0.74
0.86

8.35
0.50
0.50
0.49
0.42
0.38
0.35
0.44
0.34

Wealth Measures
House Value
Income
Non-Housing Wealth

223,697 237,174
70,126
108,148
384,285 1,088,370

200,442 349,429
41,784 56,253
346,541 953,291

216,013
60,818
371,889

279,508
95,305
1,046,057

Maintenance Spending
Do It Yourself Materials
Professional Services
Major Improvements
Total
Total / House Value

903.61
1,537
2,574
4,277
2.27%

2,622
6,074
9,661
10,963
5.18%

563.64
984.74
1,591
2,662
1.79%

1,501
2,541
5,434
5,788
3.60%

801.56
1,370
2,284
3,801
2.13%

2,348
5,270
8,644
9,756
4.78%

Time Spent on Maintenance
Males
Females
Total Household Time

67.19
27.94
67.38

140.37
84.79
153.94

45.78
14.78
34.15

107.20
51.45
92.05

61.86
24.10
57.22

133.2
76.81
138.85

Total Investment

5,255

11,147

3,136

5,958

4,628

9,944

Total Investment / House Value

3.10%

9.40%

2.23%

5.04%

2.84%

8.36%

House Value Appreciation
Log Differences
CAGR

-2.15%
0.39%

34.29%
17.79%

-6.15%
-1.04%

40.86%
20.72%

-3.29%
-0.02%

36.34%
18.68%

Observations

12,408

6,068

18,476

Notes: CAGR = Compound Annual Growth Rate. Male and female values for time spent on maintenance represents the average
time spent by males and the average time spent by females. Total household time represents the average for the household. The
male and female values can be from either single or married households. Total investment includes maintenance spending plus
household time valued at $25 per hour.
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Table 2. Expenditure and Time Allocated to Home Maintenance by Age
Age
Household Expenditure
Do It Yourself Materials
Professional Services
Major Improvements
Total Household Expenditure
Hours Spent on Maintenance
Males
Females
Total Household Time

Observations

50-85

50-64

65-74

75-84

812.27
(2377.64)
1,396.63
(5378.23)
2,343.57
(8826.40)
3,888.06
(9957.18)

1,065.37
(3235.36)
1,893.79
(7550.71)
2,904.42
(9106.47)
4,975.82
(11190.35)

816.69
(2220.10)
1,346.97
(5108.89)
2,393.15
(9949.07)
3,893.69
(10818.23)

558.81
(1474.03)
1,010.88
(2611.15)
1,685.13
(5744.86)
2777.59
(6124.73)

62.57
(134.36
24.95
(78.36)
59.22
(141.51)

75.97
(151.68)
29.51
(77.22)
79.99
(166.63)

61.77
(132.67)
27.06
(88.76)
60.65
(146.31)

46.97
(110.38)
16.37
(55.13)
37.31
(97.51)

17,380

4,189

8,219

4,972
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Table 3. Expenditure and Time Allocated to Home Maintenance by Age and Marital Status
Age
Married
Household Expenditure
Do It Yourself Materials
Professional Services
Major Improvements
Total Household Expenditure
Hours Spent on Maintenance
Males
Females
Total Household Time

Observations

Not Married
50-64
65-74

50-85

50-64

65-74

75-84

50-85

75-84

951.38
(2727.93)
1,510.27
(5123.92)
2,823.70
(10260.26)
4,497.78
(11084.59)

1,175.78
(3575.60)
1,808.43
(4917.34)
3297.04
(10033.20)
5,337.66
(10819.68)

917.24
(2386.61)
1,447.75
(5891.93)
2,786.66
(11575.77)
4,390.08
(12521.12)

668.83
(1625.12)
1,178.58
(3024.17)
2,123.03
(6563.21)
3355.72
(6968.62)

592.10
(1672.50)
1,219.61
(5748.81)
1,532.06
(5533.51)
2,857.48
(7575.39)

692.69
(1575.02)
2,180.30
(12943.53)
1,459.42
(3881.13)
3,644.13
(12382.47)

658.24
(1919.24)
1,190.29
(3562.17)
1,740.48
(6346.68)
3,070.38
(7077.59)

464.78
(1325.22)
870.46
(2198.85)
1,286.44
(4918.51)
2251.22
(5187.16)

64.91
(138.68)
25.63
(77.40)
76.37
(162.39)

77.58
(154.57)
29.88
(77.73)
92.61
(180.71

62.75
(136.11)
26.06
(80.36)
75.24
(163.47)

50.87
(116.06)
17.67
(68.75)
55.69
(125.37)

47.15
(100.24)
25.56
(80.25)
28.82
(85.66)

55.98
(108.10)
27.82
(75.00)
34.73
(85.03)

55.38
(107.72)
29.06
(103.62)
34.99
(105.09)

31.69
(82.99)
14.98
(35.16)
18.50
(49.66)

10,921

3,377

5,215

2,329

6,459

812

3,004

2,643
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Table 4. Impact of Age on Home Maintenance Expenditure

AGE >= 75

Observations
R2
Year FE
State FE
Covariates

Maintenance
(1)
-848.754***
(136.373)

Maintenance
(2)
-499.750***
(157.749)

Major
Improvement
(3)
-948.613***
(179.646)

5,800
0.021
YES
YES
NO

5,430
0.059
YES
YES
YES

8,188
0.018
YES
YES
NO

Major
Improvement
(4)
-493.828***
(172.571)

Total
Spending
(5)
-1533.953***
(196.448)

Total
Spending
(6)
-908.328***
(201.853)

7,718
0.057
YES
YES
YES

8,188
0.024
YES
YES
NO

7,718
0.082
YES
YES
YES

Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors. Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an indicator for marital status, an indicator for
mobility, and an indicator classifying the household as urban or rural. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

Table 5. Impact of Age on Time Use

AGE >= 75

Observations
2

R
Year FE
State FE
Covariates

Time
(1)
-28.263***
(3.372)

Time
(2)
-17.956***
(3.441)

Males
(3)
-25.302***
(7.049)

Males
(4)
-15.630**
(7.354)

Females
(5)
-17.699***
(3.592)

Females
(6)
-14.297***
(3.725)

6,456

5,680

2,973

2,758

3,483

3,287

0.028
YES
YES
NO

0.036
YES
YES
YES

0.036
YES
YES
NO

0.054
YES
YES
YES

0.037
YES
YES
NO

0.063
YES
YES
YES

Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors. Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an indicator for
marital status, an indicator for mobility, and an indicator classifying the household as urban or rural.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Table 6. Impact of Age on Home Maintenance Expenditure as a Function of House Value

AGE >= 75

Observations
R2
Year FE
State FE
Covariates

Maintenance
(1)
-0.002***
(0.001)

Maintenance
(2)
-0.002***
(0.001)

Major
Improvement
(3)
-0.004***
(0.001)

Major
Improvement
(4)
-0.003***
(0.001)

Total
Spending
(5)
-0.005***
(0.001)

Total
Spending
(6)
-0.004***
(0.001)

5,430
0.013
YES
YES
NO

5,430
0.022
YES
YES
YES

7,718
0.013
YES
YES
NO

7,718
0.022
YES
YES
YES

7,718
0.016
YES
YES
NO

7,718
0.026
YES
YES
YES

Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors. Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an indicator for marital status, an indicator for
mobility, and an indicator classifying the household as urban or rural. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Table 7. Cumulative Investment in Home Maintenance

Mean Investment Ages 50-64
Cumulative Investment
Ages 65-69
Ages 65-74
Ages 65-79
Ages 64-84

Do It Yourself Materials
1,065.37

Annual Expenditure
Professional Services
Major Improvements
1,893.79
2,904.42

4,504.78
8,200.41
10,944.09
13,827.71

Total
4,975.72

7,453.98
13,524.64
19,001.17
23,315.09

14,486.95
23,898.82
32,542.03
40,580.35

22,468.36
38,897.99
53,255.20
66,307.61

Hours/Year

Annualized Value ($25/hr)

Total Investment

Total Investment
as if 50-64

Cumulative
Shortfall

79.99

1,999.70

6,144.81

368.18
611.35
821.71
965.93

9,204.57
15,283.68
20,542.81
24,148.29

27,709.77
47,701.90
65,066.00
79,952.25

30,724.05
61,448.10
92,172.15
122,896.20

3,014.28
13,746.20
27,106.15
42,943.95

Household Time

Mean Investment Ages 50-64
Cumulative Investment
Ages 65-69
Ages 65-74
Ages 65-79
Ages 64-84

Notes: The top row shows the average for households in late working years. The columns below show the total cumulative spending through that age bracket. The last column
shows the difference between the total cumulative investment including time use valued at $25 per hour and what would have been spent had the household continued to invest what
they did during the ages 50-64. This column represents the total cumulative disinvestment in housing maintenance.
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Table 8. Total Investment in Home Maintenance with Time Valued at $25 Per Hour

AGE >= 75

Total
(1)
-1999.404***
(195.372)

Total
(2)
-1388.230***
(197.183)

8,722
0.028
YES
YES
NO

7,741
0.077
YES
YES
YES

Observations
R2
Year FE
State FE
Covariates

Total
House Value
(3)
-0.008***
(0.001)
8,218
0.011
YES
YES
NO

Total
House Value
(4)
-0.007***
(0.002)
8,218
0.021
YES
YES
YES

Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors. Controls include house value, income, non-housing wealth, an
indicator for marital status, and an indicator classifying the household as urban or rural.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

Table 9. Appreciation of House Values by Age
Log Difference
(1)
-0.019***
(0.007)

Log Difference
(2)
-0.015**
(0.007)

Observations
R2
Year FE
State FE
Covariates

AGE >= 75

CAGR
(3)
-0.004
(0.004)

CAGR
(4)
-0.005
(0.004)

14,032

0.017
(0.015)
11,629

14,032

-0.010
(0.08)
11,629

0.067
YES
YES
NO

0.062
YES
YES
YES

0.062
YES
YES
NO

0.059
YES
YES
YES

Cognition Score

Notes: Results presented with robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for race, marital
status, whether the household is classified as urban or rural, and good cognition score.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10
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Appendix A: Description of Variables
Variables from the HRS are taken from two sources. The first is the Enhanced FAT files
compiled by the RAND Center for the Study of Aging, which compiles the raw data from the
survey into one file for each wave making it easier to merge with other waves. The second is
from the RAND HRS data file. Developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on
Aging and the Social Security Administration, it is a cleaned file containing HRS data from all
waves of the survey (RAND HRS Data 2016). RAND takes the raw responses from the HRS –in
some cases, questions vary across waves – and combine them into a variable that is consistent
across waves.
Variable

Description

House Value

House Value comes from the RAND HRS file. Several changes were
made to this variable by the author. There are many instances where
there were incredibly large percent changes in house value between
waves. Upon visual inspection, much of this was caused by what
appears to be input error from the respondent where zeros were left off.
One example would be, if a respondent reported in 2000 a house value
of $350,000, then in 2002 a house value of $400, and in 2004 a house
value of $450,000 – it is most likely the respondent meant $400,000 in
2002. A second example would be, if a respondent reported in 2000 a
house value of $350,000, then in 2002 house value was missing, and in
2004 a house value of $450,000 but reported owning a home but not
moving in 2002. To find and correct as many of these possible errors as
possible, I searched for percent changes above 100% year over year for
households that did not move. I then visually inspected the data looking
for these types of irregularities and found 564 such cases. In cases such
as the first example, the house value was adjusted by adding the
appropriate number of zeros. In cases such as the second example, the
median value between the surrounding years was imputed, so in the
second example the house value for 2002 would be
(450,000+350,000)/2 = $400,000. In cases where a value was reported
but did not appear to have a clean fix, the household was dropped. In
the case where a house value of zero was reported in any wave, the
household was also dropped. The households identifying numbers that
were adjusted are available upon request.

105

Household Income

Non-Housing Wealth

Spending on Major
Improvements
Spending on Do-ItYourself Materials
Spending on
Professional Services
Time Spent on Home
Improvement
Age

Marital Status

Gender
(Male/Female)
Race
Good Mobility

Good Cognition

Total Investment

Household income comes from the RAND HRS file and is a sum of all
the self-reported income to the household, which includes: individual
earnings, capital income, pension income, annuity income, social
security, other government transfers, and other household income.
Non-Housing Wealth come from the RAND HRS file and is the sum of
the self-reported values of real estate excluding the primary residence,
vehicles, businesses, IRA accounts, stock value, checking accounts,
checkable deposits, bonds, and other savings minus household debt.
Major Improvement Spending comes from the RAND FAT files. No
values were imputed, if they respondent answered with a bracket they
were treated as missing.
Spending on Do-It-Yourself Materials is a CAMS variable.
Spending on Professional Services is a CAMS variable.
Time Spent on Home Improvement is a CAMS variable.
Age comes from the RAND HRS file. The household variable for age
is determined by the age of the female in married households and the
age of the individual in single households.
Marital Status comes from the RAND HRS file. This is a dummy
variable takes a value of 1 if they report they are married and a value of
0 for any other marital status.
Gender comes from the RAND HRS file.
Race comes from the RAND HRS file.
Mobility comes from the RAND HRS file and is constructed from the
variables RwMOBILA and SwMOBILA. The mobility index is a scale of
0-5. If the average for the household is less than 2 then the household is
considered to have good mobility and this variable takes a value of 1,
otherwise it takes a value of 0.
Cognition comes from the Rand HRS file and is constructed from the
variables RwCOGTOT and SwCOGTOT. The cognition score is from 035. If the average for the household is greater than 17 then the
household is considered to have good cognition and this variable take a
value of 1, otherwise it takes a value of 0.
Total Investment is a variable that is the sum of Do-It-Yourself
Materials, Spending on Professional Services, Major Improvement
Spending, and household time valued at $25/hour.
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Conclusion
Housing equity accounts for a large portion of many retirees’ savings portfolios yet they
historically have not used their housing equity to help increase consumption in retirement as
would be expected per the Life-Cycle Hypothesis. The findings of this dissertation provide new
information to help understand why this is the case for some households and examines a
previously unexplored way in which households are extracting some housing equity by forgoing
home maintenance.
Defined benefit plans provide a guaranteed source of income in retirement where
households bear no risk. Defined contribution plans potentially carry more risk depending on the
asset allocation the household chooses. The guaranteed income from a defined benefit plan may
have mitigated some of the effects of the Great Recession whereas households with defined
contribution plans experienced greater losses. I show in Chapter 1 that households with defined
contribution plans are 2.1-2.9 percent less likely to own a home in the years following the Great
Recession compared to households with a defined benefit plan. It is possible that some
households with defined contribution plans were willing to forgo homeownership to offset some
of the losses they experienced during the Great Recession. This is important because there is no
guarantee housing prices will always increase in the future they way they did in the decades prior
to the Great Recession. Therefore, it is possible that housing equity will carry some risk. Future
retirees will also be more likely to have a defined contribution plan instead of a defined benefit
plan and therefore their savings portfolio has more risk than previous generations of retirees and
it may be more common for some households to forego homeownership and use that equity to
increase consumption in retirement.
Many older households have health insurance through both Medicare and some form of
supplemental insurance. However, they still face out-of-pocket medical expenses, particularly if
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they need long-term care. As a result it is possible that some households are engaging in
precautionary savings where they hold on to their house and sell it in the event they need to pay
for an increase in out-of-pocket medical expenses. In Chapter 2 I show if retirees had more
complete health insurance and knew they would not need to pay for an increase in out-of-pocket
medical expenses, then there would be a 13-percentage point reduction in homeownership after
the age of 72. I also show that 12.8 percent of households would be willing to spend 4 percent of
their income on a health insurance plan that would cover all their out-of-pocket medical
expenses. As a result, households do not need to engage in precautionary savings and some
households chose to forgo homeownership and act more in accordance with what would be
expected per the Life-Cycle Hypothesis. Precautionary savings appears to be a reason why some
households are not extracting housing equity in retirement.
While Chapters 1 and 2 explore possible reasons why some households choose to stay in
their house or move, most older homeowners still appear to want to remain in their home during
retirement. In Chapter 3, I explore how some older homeowners may be extracting some
housing equity by forgoing investment into home maintenance. I find that homeowners reduce
their spending on home maintenance as they age but this is not offset by an increase in time spent
on home maintenance. In fact, homeowners reduce the time spent on home maintenance as they
age. I find that households aged 75 and older spend 18-28 less hours per year on home
maintenance compared to households aged 50-72. This leads to a $1,388-$1,999 decrease in the
total investment in home maintenance each year for households over the age of 75 compared to
younger households. Homes owned by individuals over the age of 75 appreciate 1.5-1.9 percent
slower each year compared to homes owed by individuals aged 50-74. I also show that
households will forgo as much as $43,000 on home maintenance between the ages of 65-84 –
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this amounts to around $2,150 annually. The results of this chapter show that time spent by
older Americans on home maintenance does not offset a decrease in spending on maintenance
and suggest that forgoing maintenance is a way in which some older homeowners are extracting
housing equity.
This dissertation offers new insights into why some older Americans are not using their
housing equity to increase consumption in retirement as well as shows a previously unexplored
way in which some older homeowners are extracting housing equity. This information is
valuable to both retirees and policymakers as Americas population is aging and people are living
longer in retirement. As a result, retirees may face different choices in in the future than many
retirees of past generations regarding the use of their housing equity in retirement. Additionally,
his dissertation helps better understand some of these choices and why households are making
them. This information will help future retirees better plan for their retirement and make
financial decisions. It also provides valuable information to policymakers as they shape policy
for the 21st century.
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